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This paper tries to show that the recent spate 
of small-farmer policies fit an identifiable historical 
pat tern, and that they are concerned with restructur-
ing the 'traditional' agricultural sector (or a certain 
part of it) in order to achieve the necessary food 
production and political stability for accumulation to 
continue more or less unabated. In this respect, 
these policies are based on the old philosophy that a 
peasant with his small plot of land and his basic 
means of subsistence is likely in general to prove a 
conservative force, to serve the interests of the major 
capitalist groups, and to constitute an important ele-
men t in the foreign policy considerations of both the 
poor and the more advanced capitalist countries. 
This paper consists of three parts. Part I exam-
ines small-farmer policies in a historical perspective 
and seeks to show that these policies are by no means 
the new phenomena that they are sometimes sup-
posed to be , that their history has been intrinsically 
connected with the contradictions in particular soci-
et ies , and that it rarely bears out the abstract concern 
tha t is placed in them. Part I I deals with contempo-
rary policies and argues that, far from constituting a 
radical break with the past, 'small-farmer' policies 
have t ended on the whole to be extremely conven-
tional, preoccupied not so much with the needs of 
the poor as with the needs of political stability and 
economic expansion of the capitalist sector. The 
final part attempts to draw the various threads to-
gether and to show how the interests of capitalist 
groups are strengthened by small-farmer pro-
grammes and their elaboration through conventional 
p lanning procedures. 
•Staff member of the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The 
Hague, Netherlands, and consultant to the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES). This 
paper was originally drafted as part of a research assignment 
under the auspices of a joint programme between ILPES, 
Santiago, and the Institute of Social Studies of The Hague. 
Introduction 
Since Robert McNamara's Nairobi speech in 
September 1973, concern with 'small farmers* 
and 'the rural poor* has become a standard 
component of the policy recommendations and 
research programmes of international develop-
ment institutions. Rural poverty suddenly ap-
peared a respectable topic, and an important 
one. With the sharp rise in world food prices in 
the early 1970s and the increased cost of im-
ported fertilizers in the wake of the petroleum 
price hike of 1973, the problem of food supplies 
and of feeding their populations was brought 
home to Third World countries in a forceful 
way. 
An yet, for all the familiar emotive inclina-
tions for prefering 'family farms' to say, 'agri-
business*, the 'small farmer' was to prove to be 
an elusive analytical category. Writings of the 
World Bank and similar institutions set out as 
though it was self-evident what a 'small farmer' 
was. He (and quite clearly it was 'he' and not 
'he or she') was abstracted from the agrarian 
context of real situations. There was little con-
cern with the historical context in which these 
people found themselves, or with the political 
environment in which these 'small-farmer' pol-
icies might (or might not) be applied. Just how 
much of an impediment ownership patterns, 
tenure arrangements and local power struc-
tures had proved to be in the implementation of 
'equity-oriented' small-farmer policies was lost 
in the optimistic tone of the World Bank's pre-
sentation. The small farm was labelled a target 
for development aid, but there was such a dif-
ference in the meaning of farm size from coun-
try to country (or from province to province) 
that it was very difficult in practice to come to 
terms with the abstract notion of aiding 'the 
small producer'. 
This was one problem. A second, more fun-
damental problem that partly explained the 
stand that these institutions took was the para-
digm in the light of which their discussions 
were cast. This influenced their perception of 
the small farmer's problem and of the kinds of 
behaviour patterns they considered to be rele-
vant; it shaped the way that they looked at the 
planning process, and the kind of rural com-
munity that they were likely to create. It was a 
paradigm with neo-classical (and neo-Malthu-
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sian) overtones which, for all their references to 
structural change, placed its emphasis fairly 
and squarely on questions of efficiency as mea-
sured in terms of purely quantitative notions 
such as the amount of inputs used, the volume 
of credit and other financial resources that were 
made available, and the size of the farm.1 
The problem facing these Third World 
countries (at least in the rural sphere) was seen 
as one of producing sufficient food to meet the 
needs of a rapidly increasing population. To 
achieve this, higher priority was to be given to 
small producers (defined as people working 
less than 2 hectares of land), organised on the 
basis of (nuclear) family units and oriented 
squarely towards sales for the market. Given 
the very real limits on cultivable land (especial-
ly in Asia) and the lag in employment creation 
in other sectors, small-farmer production was, 
in this view, not only attractive but could well 
be efficient when measured in terms of criteria 
such as employment and output per unit of 
land.2 Seen in this light the issue became one of 
determining the correct blend of inputs and 
services to ensure a sustained increase in pro-
ductivity in the small-farm sector, and this was 
automatically considered to hinge on "access to 
Discussion on small-farmer policies often over-
looks the fact that they have been present in 
thinking on agricultural and rural development 
at least since the Second World War, and in 
most parts of the Third World since long before 
that. The small-farm sector was an important 
element in the Russian debates of the 1920s 
and in the whole question of the co-operative 
movement in the 1930s; independence move-
iBehind this lay the notion that an agrarian society in 
which everyone had a plot of land of more or less the same 
size would be 'egalitarian'. Where land is the main factor of 
production this may be the case. But once access to capital 
and modern inputs becomes important, equal-sized plots 
are unlikely to ensure an egalitarian structure. Farm size 
was in this sense a quantitative notion. 
2The underlying philosophy stretches back further, at 
least to the beginning of McNamara's presidency of the 
World Bank Group in 1968, if not before. See IBRD, World 
Bank Operations: sectoral projects and policies, Balti-
more, 1972. 
new thechnology and the capital to utilise it" 
and on "the need for new and improved service 
systems to support a modern system of agricul-
ture".3 What was at stake was "the modernisa-
tion and monetarisation of rural society" and its 
rapid incorporation into the capitalist econo-
my.4 
This being so, a pertinent question which 
immediately arises is how this 'incorporation' 
was to be carried out—how small-farmer pol-
icies related to macro-strategies, what kinds of 
strategies they were in practice promoting, the 
nature of the planning process by which they 
were implemented, and the nature of the agrar-
ian society that they were likely to create. One 
of the sustaining theses of this paper is that 
small-farmer policies must be seen in their his-
torical context and analysed in relation to mac-
ropolicies and to the process of capital accumu-
lation taking place at a national and an interna-
tional level. It will be argued that it is this 
which determines to a large degree where and 
how far the 'traditional' small-farm sector re-
mains intact, where and in what ways it is 
strengthened of re-structured, and where it is 
replaced by larger units of agricultural produc-
tion. 
ments of Africa and Asia looked for much of 
their support to the peasant producer, and in 
Latin America the land reform programmes of 
liberal and, leftist parties contained similar 
concerns. It is true that they involved rather 
different notions as to the nature and potential 
role of the small-farm sector, but it is also unde-
niable that there exists a considerable body of 
evidence and historical experience in which it 
proved (in one sense or another) of strategic 
importance. 
It is worthwhile looking at this experience 
and asking ourselves what insights are to be 
gleaned from it that can help in interpreting the 
upsurge of small-farm policies in the last five to 
ten years. In doing so, it would seem particular-
3IBRJD, The Assault on World Poverty, Baltimore, 
1975, pp. 5 and 10. 
*/fcid.,p.3. 
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ly apt to try and analyse the role which small 
farmers have played (or have been expected to 
play) in different strategies of economic and 
political development. In this section an at-
tempt will be made to outline some of the main 
types of small-farmer policies that have been 
introduced in the non-socialist world and in 
Third World countries in the periods roughly 
before and after 1950. The choice of year is 
little more than one of convenience: more rele-
vant, perhaps, is that we will look at small-
farmer policies first in the context of what is 
labelled a 'colonial export economy' and then 
of one that placed greater weight on industrial-
ization. 
1. Small-farmer policies before 1950 
Prior to the 1939-1945 war (and even in the 
postwar period in many parts of the world), the 
majority of Third World countries could still 
be described as having a 'colonial export' econ-
omy based on the export of primary products to 
Europe and North America and on the import of 
metropolitan manufactures. Government pol-
icies for the expansion of these economies 
placed their emphasis on infrastructural devel-
opment to facilitate the production and evacua-
tion of export commodities, to distribute im-
ported goods to different parts of the country, 
and to meet the local manpower needs of an 
expanding economy. In some cases (not only in 
Latin America but also, for example, India) in-
dustry was already a substantial sector of the 
economy. However, such countries were still 
very much an exception, and the prevailing 
ideology was bound up with the colonial con-
cept of export-led growth. 
And yet, even in this context, serious con-
cern with small-farmer production often existed. 
It was a concern that was sometimes short-lived, 
and at times very much of secondary impor-
tance. After all, almost nothing was known of 
the structure and needs of 'traditional agricul-
ture'; it was rarely the subject of continuous 
technical research, and the efforts that were 
made to improve (or rather to change) it, were 
in general crude.5 The enclosure of land for 
5 T h e research that was carried out was basically of two 
kinds. The first was anthropological or ethnographical in 
large-scale commercial production had adverse 
effects on a great many village communities, 
depriving them of land and leading to the pro-
letarianization of the village poor.6 Weaker pro-
ducers were pushed to more marginal lands, 
and more generally small farmers found them-
selves confronted with tenure structures, na-
tional policies and legal institutions which 
were heavily biased in favour of capitalist 
groups.7 
This aspect of the colonial situation and of 
capitalist expansion in Latin America is now 
well documented and it is frequently cited. 
And yet, notwithstanding this point, the fact 
remains that even in the context of these ex-
port-oriented macrostrategies and of the rather 
conservative political regimes that tended to 
support them, small-farmer policies were con-
sidered, and were in some cases preferred and 
nature, and the second, associated with agricultural sta-
tions, was intented to show the 'traditional' farmer what 
could be achieved. Colonial governments failed to see pas-
ture and reserve lands as an essential part of existing pro-
duction systems, especially in areas where shifting agricul-
ture or nomadic herding were the rule. Agricultural stations 
were conceived as demonstration centres, and they were 
more concerned with placing 'native agriculture' on a 
'scientific basis' than with helping the peasant poducer in 
his own situation. 
6 F o r evidence of this see the Report of the Kandyan 
Peasantry Commission, Colombo, Sessional Paper No. 
XVIII of 1951; KJ . Pelzer, "The Agrarian Conflict in East 
Sumatra", Pacific Affairs, June 1957; Erich Jacoby, Agrar-
ian Unrest in Southeast Asia, London, 1961; George Beck-
ford, Persistent Poverty, London, 1972; Peter Klaren, For-
mación de las haciendas azucareras y orígenes del APRA, 
Lima, 1976, chapter 3; Frank Mills, "Production Relation-
ships Among Small-Scale Fanners in St. Kitts", Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1976, p . 154; David 
Dunham, "Land, Plantations and Peasants in Sri Lankan 
Development : the period prior to 1900", Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague, 1980. 
7 This is very clear in the case of what is often called 
' the planter raj'. See Carl Stone, "Political Aspects of Post-
War Agricultural Policies in Jamaica 1945-1970", Social 
and Economic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 1974; George 
Beckford, "The Dynamics of Growth and the Nature of 
Metropolitan Plantation Enterprise", Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 456 f; and 
Dunham, op. cit., 1980. Similar biases are well noted for 
Brazil: see Celso Furtado, The Economic Growth of Brazil, 
Berkeley, 1963, and Martin Katzman, "The Brazilian Fron-
tier in Comparative Perspective", Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1975. See also the 
extensive literature on white settlement in the United 
States, Canada and Australia. On the latter see Rosa Lu-
xemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, translated by A. 
Schwarzschild, London, 1951, chapter 29. 
142 CEPAL BEVIEW No. 18 / December 1982 
even firmly promoted. Some derived from a 
strong philanthropic dimension,8 but more gen-
erally it would seem to have been the case that 
they were promoted because they were instru-
mental in export production or because they 
were associated with situations of crisis for the 
governments concerned. Basically there were 
two types of policies involved. The first were 
designed primarily to strengthen and maintain 
the existing economic system; they were con-
cerned with the increased production of export 
crops and with the production of staple foods 
for non-food producers. The second, which 
were a response to demands for change, were 
largely associated with the hoary question of 
land and land tenure reform. In many cases 
these motives overlapped; nevertheless, they 
will be considered separately for analytical 
purposes in order to explore the logic that lay 
behind them and the nature of the political 
context in which they emerged. 
(a) The role of small farmers in export 
production 
The first of these situations was one in 
which export production could be more ef-
ficiently, or at least (for the capitalists) more 
safely carried out by small farmers selling to 
large-scale (usually foreign) commercial firms 
or to independent centrally-located processing 
mills.9 
8 S e e for example Robert Chambers, Settlement 
Schemes in Tropical Africa, London, 1969, Part I. 
^ h i s picture of the small farmer in export expansion 
has to b e treated rather carefully, since it is often debatable 
as to how far it can really b e characterized as a 'small-
farmer' system, Since the 1920s the idea of frontiers as 
"wi ld unsett led places where resources are free, rules do 
not apply, and where at the cost of personal hardship and 
danger an individual can better himself by his own efforts" 
has b e e n a recurring theme of western romance and his-
toriography. Even in the period of white settlement (of the 
American West) this was simply not true. In the United 
States rail companies were granted land and allocated it to 
p ioneer farmers on a massive scale, while in Canada the 
North-Wegt Land and Hudson Bay Companies controlled 
over half of the land that there was to be settled. Similarly, 
the Australian frontier was not a frontier opened up by 
small prospectors and family farmers, but by capitalist 
ranchers with numerous flocks of sheep and dependent 
wage labour. They were actively supported by large land 
companies and banks. See Rosa Luxemburg, op. cit., and 
Brian Fitzpatrick, "The Big Man's Frontier and Australian 
Fann ing" , Agricultural History, Vol. 21,1947. The image 
Though it is difficult to generalize about 
the circumstances under which a system of this 
kind began to emerge, it seems fair to say that 
during this early period it was particularly 
viable where one or more of the following cri-
teria applied: (i) in areas where for certain his-
torical or climatic reasons white settlement was 
difficult; (ii) for those crops which did not re-
quire high capital outlays to reach acceptable 
production levels (or where they offered com-
paratively little advantage); (iii) where cultiva-
tion could be carried out for most if not all of the 
year with family labour; and (iv) where limited 
outlets and the risk of deterioration and loss in 
the marketing process kept the producer very 
dependent upon his buyers. Where small farm-
ers could be controlled through credit and 
through marketing arrangements and offered 
the buyer a regular supply of a uniform and 
fairly high-quality product, it was generally in 
the interests of major capitalist groups to leave 
small farmers with the responsibility for pro-
duction, and with it much of the risks. 
Two particular cases stand out as classic 
examples of small-farmer production of export 
crops during this period, namely, those of 
Ghanaian cocoa and of the rice-exporting coun-
tries of Eastern Asia. Although these cases dif-
fered in a number of important respects, they 
were all promoted by colonial interests (except 
in the case of Thailand) and were tightly con-
trolled through tenure arrangements, market-
ing structures and the politital system. 
In the case of Ghana, cocoa was produced 
on both privately-owned and on lineage lands, 
on small farms of one or two hectares or even 
less, run by the family with the help of migrant 
labour from further north. Until 1945, and in a 
somewhat revised form until very much later 
than that, a cartel of some thirteen European 
companies (the so-called "Pool Firms") had 
tight control of Ghana's (then the Gold Coast's) 
international trade.10 They bought the crop di-
of the 'pioneer ' fermer which underlines much of our 
thinking on 'colonization' is in fact very largely a construc-
ted one; it is a myth, a product of western ideology and of 
western romance. 
1 0In 1938 these 13 firms controlled some 93% of all the 
cocoa bought in Ghana; this was heavily concentrated in 4 
or 5 firms, the principal of which was the United Africa 
Company (a subsidiary of Lever Brothers). See the Report 
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rectly from the small producers through their 
own network of brokers and petty buyers, with 
liberal use of cash advances to secure their sup-
plies,11 Once this organization had been estab-
lished it was difficult to change it, nor was there 
any demand for change in the production sys-
tem. 
The second case was that of the rice-ex-
porting countries of Eastern Asia, namely 
Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and Taiwan. 
Though all were examples of small-farmer rice 
production, there were also variations amongst 
them. On the one hand were countries such as 
Burma, where migrant labour and an abundant 
supply of thinly-populated land made possible 
the extension of 'traditional' production meth-
ods under the stimulation and control of for-
eign traders. On the other hand were areas 
such as Taiwan, where land was more or less 
fully occupied from the beginning of this ex-
port expansion and where the growing impor-
tance of rice produced by small farmers as an 
export commodity was associated with the in-
troduction of new varieties under colonial rule. 
In the Burmese case high prices resulting 
from European demand sparked off heavy mi-
gration to frontier areas. This was accompanied 
by a proliferation of traders and moneylenders 
providing the credit needed for the massive 
extension of rice production, while European 
merchants dominated milling and monopo-
lized the exports to Europe.12 There was a sharp 
decline in prices after the 1914-1918 war; 
of the Commission of Enquiry into the West African Cocoa 
Industry (the Nowell Commission), H.M.S.O., London, 
1938. 
n O n the early cocoa development see Polly Hill, The 
Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, Cambridge, 
1963. Her thesis was essentially that cocoa production was 
from the very beginning a form of incipient capitalism. On 
the organization and control of trade see David Dunham, 
Group Interests and Spatial Structures: A Study of Re-
gional Development in Southern Ghana, University of 
Amsterdam, 1977. 
12See Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic De-
velopment and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 
1852-1941, Madison, 1974; and Hla Myint, The Economics 
of Developing Countries, (4th edition), London, 1973. To 
give an impression of the scale of this transformation, (he 
population of Lower Burma increased from 2.6 million in 
1871-1872 to 4.1 million in 1900, while the area cropped 
rose from 0.4 million hectares to 3.5 million hectares over 
the same period. 
mortgaged land was lost as a result of foreclo-
sures, and there was a gradual concentration of 
paddy land in the hands of the by-then-estab-
lished landlord class. In this sense the case of 
the Burma delta followed an almost classic path 
of capitalist development. 
The example of Taiwan under Japanese 
occupation was very different. The export of 
rice for the Japanese market was underway by 
the middle of the 1920s and it was associated 
with the introduction of a new variety.13 The 
average size of farm was about 2 hectares, and 
colonial policy rested heavily on the small-farm 
sector. However, a large proportion of the pro-
ducers were either sharecroppers or tenant 
farmers, and the Japanese worked almost entire-
ly through the landlord class. Small producers 
marketed their rice via their landlords (many of 
whom were also in practice millers) and export 
was solely in the hands of Japanese firms. 
Comparable cases of small-farmer involve-
ment in export production can be found in 
many other parts of the world, reflecting similar 
patterns of differentiation and of control. In 
Colombia the average size of the coffee farm 
was still small during this period. In 1950 it was 
just over three hectares; over a third of all the 
coffee farms in Colombia (36%) were of less 
than one hectare, and the industry was con-
trolled by some five export houses.14 In Sao 
Paulo coffee lands were given to colonos and to 
small fanners working on a sharecropping 
basis. Under this system the owner not only 
supplied the land, but dictated how the land 
was to be used, the system of cultivation that 
was to be followed, and the types of manage-
ment practices that were to be applied.15 
13See S.C. Hsieh and T.H. Lee, Agricultural Devel-
opment and its Contribution to Economic Growth in 
Taiwan, JCRR, Taipei, 1966; S.M. Yeh, Rice Marketing in 
Taiwan, JCRR, Taipei, 1955, and Taiwan Agricultural 
Statistics 1901-1965, JCRR, Taipei, 1966. 
14United Nations/FAO, Coffee in Latin America: Pro-
ductivity, Problems and Future Prospects, Vol. I, New 
York, 1958, p. 27; J.W.F. Rowe, The World's Coffee, Lon-
don, 1963, p. 64, and Absalon Machado, El café: de la 
aparcería al capitalismo, Bogotá, 1977. 
15United Nations/FAO, Coffee in Latín America..., op. 
cit., 1958, Vol. II, p. 89, and Thomas Holloway, "The 
Coffee Colono of Sâo Paulo, Brazil: Migration and Mobil-
ity, 1880-1930", in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge 
(eds.)( Land and Labour in Latin America, London, 1977. 
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In the West Indies banana and sugar pro-
duction hada significant small-farmer sector.16 
To this list could be added Fijian sugar after 
1920, oil-palm and cocoa in Nigeria, coffee in 
French West Africa* West African groundnuts, 
and East African cotton. There were also many 
cases where small farmers played a role in 'out-
grower' production, producing for sale to the 
neighbouring plantation factory or to a process-
ing mill.17 
In short, there is no dearth of evidence to 
show that the role of small producers in export 
production was far from insignificant during 
this period. What is more, replacing them with 
large producers was not an issue so much as 
establishing tighter control over their produc-
tion and finding ways of raising the quality and 
yield of their crop through the introduction of 
better cultivation practices and management 
methods and, more generally of acquiring a 
cheaper product. Priority was clearly assigned 
to export growth, rather than to the welfare and 
development os small producers. Many of 
these people did benefit and were amongst the 
most prosperous small producers in the country 
concerned, but this they could only achieve at a 
certain cost, the principal features of which in-
cluded the nature of their existing tenure ar-
rangements, their vulnerability to changes in 
prices on external markets, and their depen-
dence on those who controlled the access to 
these markets and those who controlled the 
processing needed before export. 
Small farmers were part and parcel of the 
process of capitalist expansion. Within the 
16For example over three-quarters of all banana grow-
ers in Jamaica, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Gre-
nada operated farms of less than 2 hectares in the early 
1950s. Furthermore, the vast majority of these specialized 
in export production and were tightly controlled by ex-
porting firms. See Dennis McFarlane, "The Future of the 
Banana Industry in the West Indies", Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1964, p. 70. On the sugar industry 
see George Abbott, "The West Indies Sugar Industry with 
some Long-Term Projects of Supply", Social and Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1964; and Ramiro Guerra y 
Sánchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean: an Econom-
ic History of Cuban Agriculture, first published 1927, 
English translation, New Haven, 1964. 
17See George Beckford, "The Growth of Major Trop-
ical Export-Crop Industries". Social and Economic 
Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1964; P.P. Courtenay, Plantation 
Agriculture, London, 1965, chapter 4; and on French West 
Africa, Jean Suret Canale, L'Afrique Noire, Paris, 1962. 
parameters set by the export model {and the 
institutional structures that carried it out), they 
also acquired certain new opportunities and 
their success encouraged others to export pro-
duction. The small-farm sector developed its 
own dynamics of accumulation and social dif-
ferentiation, with betterment for some (often 
for many), but indebtedness, loss of land and 
impoverishment for a great many more. As the 
number of producers increased prices often 
fell; farmers were left heavily dependent on 
'modern' inputs, on cash incomes to buy their 
foodstuffs, inputs and other 'necessities' and to 
pay their tax. The important point, however, 
was that the possibilities for small farmers to 
improve their position ultimately depended on 
continued interest in these crops on the part of 
richer capitalist groups, on the fortunes of these 
crops in international markets, and on the ways 
in which those who were in a position to control 
this trade used small-farmer production to meet 
their own ends. 
(b) Small farmers in domestic food production 
The second situation in which small-farmer 
policies were introduced in order to maintain 
the prevailing economic system was one char-
acterized by serious and often persistent short-
ages of food, where the Government was faced 
with a reduction in foreign supplies or the 
prospect of a rapidly mounting import bill be-
cause of a shortfall in domestic supplies of the 
staple diet. In an agricultural export economy 
priority was given to export production, at the 
expense of domestic food production. This sit-
uation was generally characterized by a struc-
tural imbalance which was exposed at times 
when export values decreased and costly im-
ports of food began to prove an embarrassment, 
or when the power of agrarian capitalists began 
to decline and they were challenged by urban 
groups and by the votes and demands of pro-
ducers outside the export sector. In some cases 
both of these trends occurred simultaneously. 
By the 1920s and 1930s many such econ-
omies suddenly found themselves vulnerable; 
a large proportion of their population was in the 
'traditional' sector, unemployment was high, 
and with significant improvements in health 
conditions in the rural areas pressure on the 
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little good cultivable land available to the ma-
jority of small village producers began to in-
crease. By the 1950s the import bill for food-
stuffs was often considerable: Brazil was im-
porting almost a million tons of wheat and 
wheat flour each year, and Cuba, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and many more countries were 
highly dependent on external supplies of their 
basic foods.18 In this context colonization and 
small-farmer food production became a topic of 
concern to policy-makers as a means of keeping 
these export economies viable systems. 
A good illustration of this is the case of Sri 
Lanka during and immediately after the two 
world wars. The experience of the 1914-1918 
war, for example, and its immediate aftermath 
made the Government acutely aware of the ex-
tent of the Colony's dependence on imported 
rice. Over 60% of supplies came from foreign 
sources, and when these were cut off the struc-
tural imbalance built into the export economy 
was such that there was a shortage of crisis 
proportions.19 Import purchasing power was 
reduced by the slump in the estate sector after 
the war, and there was a constant threat of India 
imposing export duties on rice in order to try 
and resolve its own food situation. The result 
was a drive for self-sufficiency in rice produc-
tion and growing concern for the problems of 
the small producer.20 
A similar situation ocurred in Jamaica in 
the late 1930s. The country was confronted 
with shortages of food which continued during 
the war, and with the economic decline of the 
dominant planter class there was a marked shift 
in priorities towards small-farmer food produc-
18FAO, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 
Vol. IV, No. 2 (Trade Statistics), Rome, 1950, pp. 9f. 
19There was a very definite political dimension in this 
in that the Sri Lankans had a majority (albeit a divided 
majority) on the Legislative Council by 1921, and these 
people saw the peasant producer as a potential constituent. 
This point will be taken up later. On the structural imbal-
ance of such an economy see Gamani Corea, The Instabili-
ty of an Export Economy, Colombo, Marga Institute, 1975. 
2°On this see Ben Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonisation 
in Ceylon, London, 1957, and David Dunham, Govern-
ment Policy Towards Peasants and Towards Colonisation: 
Sri Lanka prior to W31, The Hague, Institute of Social 
Studies, 1980. 
tion in the context of considerably expanded 
land settlement schemes.21 
In Ghana there was mounting concern 
with food production in the wake of the 'urban 
disturbance' of the post-war years,22 while else-
where in Africa there was a paternalistic con-
cern with 'conservation' and 'improved prac-
tices' to combat the threat of famine in periph-
eral .areas.23 The list could be extended, but the 
point that stands out is that in general the em-
phasis on export crops had been taken too far, 
exposing the fragility of the domestic food sit-
uation —a fact which very quickly came to the 
surface when the system was threatened, as it 
was during the depression years of the 1930s 
and in the course of the 1939-1945 war. In this 
period the power of the 'colonial' export class 
was beginning to weaken; the economic sys-
tem of many of the colonies could no longer be 
maintained without a shift towards increased 
food production, and in many cases this led to a 
greater concern for 'peasant production'. 
(c) Politics and the demand for land and land 
tenure reform 
The third case, interrelated in many ways 
with both of the earlier ones, centered around the 
thorny question of land and land tenure reform. 
The concern with the peasantry and with food 
production invariably touched upon the avail-
ability of land and upon the question of land 
ownership and of private property. Export pro-
duction and other forms of large-scale commer-
cial agriculture had in many areas pre-empted 
the possibility of peasant expansion. The effect 
2ISee C. Stone, op. cit., 1974, and Ken Post, Arise Ye 
Starvelings, The Hague, 1979. 
22See the Report of the Enquiry into Disturbances in 
the Gold Coast, London, H.M.S.O., 1948. 
^Robert Chambers, Settlement Schemes..., op. cit., 
1969, p. 22. In 1954 the Belgian Government for example, 
reflected precisely this when they prefaced their remarks 
on a U.N. questionnaire by saying "in the Congo we have to 
deal with a primitive rural society which is profoundly 
apathetic, fatalistic and attached to its ancestral traditions" 
and went on to argue this as a justification for "native 
agricutural settlement" ("paysannat indigène"). See UN/ 
FAO/ILO, Progress in Land Reform: Analysis of Replies by 
Governments to a United Nations Questionnaire, New 
York, 1954, p. 108. 
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was not always a direct one. At times the dif-
ferent forms of production did not compete, as 
plantations were located in the upland areas 
and paddy rice was concentrated in valley bot-
toms.24 And even where they did the implica-
tions were not always immediately apparent. 
In was often only later, with health improve-
ments, population growth and increased social 
differentiation, that the pressure on available 
land began to increase and there was a growing 
demand for some measure of redistribution. 
In Asia the highly skewed pattern of land 
ownership had long been recognized. There 
were clashes between landlords and tenants 
and between estates and villagers, often be-
cause peasant farms (or the income left to a 
family after payment of'rents') had simply be-
come too small to enable families to live. In the 
Philippines the proportion of landless farmers 
was "astonishingly high" in the 1930s, and 
there were frequent disputes.25 In Sri Lanka 
tenant farmers in the wet zone of the country 
were oppressed by tenure arrangements and by 
the activities of headmen employed for the 
administration of local affairs.26 Much the same 
could have been said for rural Java, where there 
was concern for "the problem of overcrowd-
ing" and where inequalities in ownership and 
in access to land had long been recorded.27 
In much of Latin America and the Carib-
bean the situation was also similar. Physical 
displacement was a prominent feature of com-
mercial expansion; the indigenous population 
(in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru especially, but 
also elsewhere) were forced to the altiplano 
and to remoter parts of the country (as in Co-
lombia) where they endeavoured to farm the 
marginal soils and the limited lands which 
24In many areas there was a distinct and definite segre-
gation, implying different ecological requirements and dif-
ferent access conditions. 
25J.R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National 
Development, New York, 1942, p. 380. On this see also K.J. 
Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement in Tropical Asia, New York, 
1948. 
26See the Report of the Commission on the Headman 
System, Sessional Paper No. II of 1922, and its successor 
No. XXVII of 1935. For an impression of the way caste 
operated see Barrie Morrison, M.P. Moore and M.U. Ishak 
Lebbe (eds.), The Disintegrating Village, Colombo, 1979. 
27K.J. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement, op. cit., 1948, chap-
ter IX. 
were left to them.28 The most urgent demands 
in the 1930s and 1940s came, however, from the 
densely populated rural areas, from the mini-
fundistas tightly controlled by tenancy struc-
tures and confined to areas where there was 
simply not enough land to afford them subsis-
tence.29 Many could claim no more than a 
''squatter' status and were living under constant 
threat of summary eviction. Others had been 
squeezed onto the hillsides where soils were 
often poor and easily eroded. There was in-
creasing fragmentation of the land available, 
and a growing problem of landlessness, pover-
ty and unemployment.30 
In most of these cases the basic problem 
was not simply one of unequal land ownership 
and tenure arrangements, but one of power: of 
the economic, social and political hold of the 
landowning class. Small fanners were faced 
with a series of pressures and institutions 
which, while they were sometimes (though by 
no means always) paternalistic in nature, pro-
vided them with little scope for social mobility 
and conceded them very low incomes and very 
few rights.31 In a situation of mounting discon-
tent, with landowners organized into right-
wing parties influencing government and ad-
ministration, the social climate was often one of 
increasing repression. The need for land re-
form was portrayed (and in time perceived) as 
'an explosive force'.32 
In Africa the relative abundance of uncul-
tivated and reasonably fertile land meant that 
in general there were fewer strains of this kind, 
28TJN/FAO/ILO, Progress in Land Reform: Third 
Report, New York, 1962, p. 2; Solon Barraclough and Juan 
Collater (eds.), Agrarian Structure in Latin America, To-
ronto and London, 1973; and Henri Favre, "The Dynamics of 
Indian Peasant Society and Migration to Coastal Planta-
tions in Central Peru", in Duncan and Rutledge (eds.), in 
Land and Labour..., op. cit., 1977. 
29See United Nations, Report on the World Social 
Situation, New York, 1963, pp. 131-133. 
30J.nter-American Committee on Agricultural Devel-
opment (CIDA), Tenencia de la tierra y reforma agraria en 
América Latina, OAS, Washington, D.C., 1971; see also 
Orlando Fais Borda, El hombre y la tierra en Boyacá: 
desarrollo histórico de una sociedad minifundista, Bogotá, 
1957. 
3iSee on this CIDA, Tenencia de la tierra..., op. cit., 
1971. 
32Thomas Carrol, "Land Reform as an Explosive 
Force", in JJ . Tepaske and S.N. Fisher (eds.), Explosive 
Forces in Latin America, Colombia, 1964, p. 89. 
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with some exceptions. In Zimbabwe (Southern 
Rhodesia), Kenya and Southern Africa Euro-
pean settlement seriously reduced the good 
land available to African people. Exacerbating 
or creating population problems' in the re-
maining areas, it also led to a political situation 
in which African expansion was seen as a threat 
to European security.33 In Kenya the situation 
was considered to be particularly threatening, 
culminating in the Emergency of the 1950s, 
when the Kikuyus rebelled. 
And yet, at least until the early 1950s, there 
were very few statistical surveys on which to 
base any serious analysis of land distribution. 
In many countries the prevailing pattern was 
only too clear, but in general the information 
available was 'spotty and conjectural'.34 It was 
very difficult to say whether (or how far) the 
problems that came to light in particular cases 
were representative of the national picture or 
not. The whole question of land and land ten-
ure reform and of colonization (or transmigra-
tion) was therefore largely a political response 
to social contradictions and pressures for 
change. 
The latter in practice took on various 
forms. In colonial areas land policy had proved 
an angry issue by the turn of the century. In 
India Gandhi was fighting to improve the lot of 
impoverished villagers as early as the 1914-
1918 war; the abolition of landlordism was part 
of the socialist programme of M.N. Roy (to align 
the National Congress with "exploited workers 
and peasants"), and the Congress supported 
small-farmer interest at the All-India level.35 In 
the Caribbean, estate land was very much a 
political issue, and by 1950 the sugar industry 
lived in an atmosphere of mounting hostility, of 
^R. Chambers, Settlements Schemes..., op. cit., 1969, 
chapter 2. The European response to the mounting land 
problems was one with overtones of "confining and control-
ling African farmers in their own areas" (p. 25). 
34See UN/FAO/ILO, Progress in Land Reform, New 
York, 1954; and Richard Schaedel, "Land Reform Studies", 
Latin American Research Review, Vol 1, No. 1,1965, p. 75. 
35For a summary of the material available see Sipko de 
Boer, Peasant Movements in India during the Twentieth 
Century,. The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, 1973; 
Gene Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in 
India, Berkeley, 1959; and Myron Weiner, The Politics of 
Scarcity, Public Pressure and Political Response in India, 
Chicago, 1962. 
strikes, riots, labour disputes and the burning 
of cane.36 
Throughout the colonial world, this op-
position concern with the needs of village pro-
ducers was never far from the fight against im-
perialist rule, and in this respect it was used as a 
plank in a broader campaign.37 With the gradual 
move to elected representation and the increas-
ing politicisation of rural areas in the wake of 
improvements in transportation and literacy 
levels, the ownership of land and the lot of the 
rural poor were skillfully used by nationalist 
leaders to rally support and to hit out at the bias 
inherent in colonial rule.38 
The situation in Latin America was not 
very different. In some areas there was not only 
discontent, there were campesino uprisings, 
mass meetings in rural towns, determined and 
armed invasions of large estates, and mounting 
support for the small farmers' cause amongst 
urban groups. These events were to create a 
widespread feeling of apprehension and of in-
security, alarming not only the traditional land-
owning class, but a wider range of national pol-
iticians, businessmen and others as well.3a 
In many cases the social tensions that were 
being generated were of such proportions that 
they were not so easily controlled and could not 
be ignored. Nor were these governments in-
variably so insensitive to the impoverishment 
of village communities trying to feed their fam-
ilies on minute parcels of land, or with no land 
at all. With the heightening of the depression 
and the increasing population growth of the 
post-war era, they were above all aware of the 
potential political threat posed by uncontrolled 
situations of deprivation and exploitation. As a 
36See W. Arthur Lewis, Issues in Land Settlement 
Policy, Report to the Caribbean Commission West Indian 
Conference, 1950. 
37Whether the main target should be colonialism or 
capitalism was very often a topic of considerable debate 
(especially in India), but in neither case were problems of 
the small producer perse of central concern. 
•^It also served in some cases (for example Sri Lanka) 
to distract attention from the fact that the nationalist leaders 
came from landowning families. See David Dunham, "Pol-
itics and Land Settlement Schemes: the Case of Sri Lanka", 
forthcoming in Development and Change. 
39See Rodolfo Stavenhagen (éd.), Agrarian Problems 
and Peasant Movements in Latin America (New York, 
1970), which provides material on specific cases. 
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result, various 'small-farmer' policies began to 
emerge. 
These policies were basically of four main 
kinds. Firstly, there was the increasing impor-
tance of government-sponsored colonization 
schemes, especially in Asia.40 Depression led 
to retrenchment in the plantation sector. In In-
donesia it seemed quite unlikely that the plan-
tations would ever employ the same numbers 
again; pressure on land in Java had reached 
dangerous proportions, and the Government 
turned to large-scale colonization of the Outer 
Islands by way of response.41 In the Philip-
pines the 'opening up' of the island of Min-
danao began during this period, while in Sri 
Lanka the Land Development Ordinance of 
1935 paved the way for a series of settlement 
schemes.42 In Latin America 'spontaneous col-
onization' was permitted for rather similar 
reasons, while settlement schemes in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe were introduced in an attempt 
to defuse a potentially dangerous situation.43 
The second response was to 'reserve' lands 
for the use of the local population. Policies of 
this kind were generally presented as a means 
of 'protecting' the needs of local communities 
against the incursions of speculators, money-
lenders or the plantation system, preserving 
the possibility of village expansion (or subsis-
tence production) as their population grew. 
Examples of this were the 'mapping out' and 
protection of lands for villagers' use in the Wet 
Zone of Sri Lanka, the creation of Malay reser-
vations in Malaysia, and the setting aside of 
lands for 'indigenous occupation' in South Afri-
ca, Kenya and Zambia (then Northern Rhode-
sia).44 
40Earlier African projects were more concerned with 
clearing the land for European settlement or with moving 
people from unhealthy areas (notably areas of sleeping 
sickness). These involved a very different context from that 
described here. 
¿'Large-scale colonization took place principally be-
tween 1932 and 1941. See KJ. Pelzer, Pioneer Settle-
ment..., op. cit., 1948, p. 228. 
42
 See K.J. Pelzer, ibid., andB. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant 
Colonisation..., op. cit., 1957. 
•*3This was particularly true of the areas of irrigated 
settlement. See R. Chambers, Settlement Schemes..., op. 
cit., 1969, and on Latin America, CIDA, Tenencia..., op. 
cit., 1971. 
MReport of the Land Commission..., op. cit., 1929; 
Erich Jacoby, "The Problems of Vulnerable Communities 
Thirdly, legislation was introduced to reg-
ulate tenancy arrangements and sales of land 
and fourthly, land redistribution policies were 
implemented. The legislation aimed at land 
tenure reform, for example, was far more fre-
quent and far more prolific during this period 
than is sometimes realized. The Philippines 
had a particularly long history of agrarian legis-
lation, reflecting the violence taking place in 
the countryside.45 The Land Tenure Act passed 
in Colombia in 1936 had a similar history, 
while in India there were a series of tenure 
laws passed by the various states.46 When it 
came to redistribution of land there were far 
fewer examples. The Mexican revolution was 
the clearest case, though Bolivia undertook se-
rious reforms in 1952, as had Guatemala in 
1944, only to see them overthrown in counter-
revolution a decade later.47 
The important point here was that sweep-
ing measures for the redistribution of land only 
occurred in the wake of radical political change 
at the national level; in most societies land-
owners were amongst the principal powerhold-
ers, and there was little chance of them will-
ingly sanctioning policies that were likely to 
undermine their own power position. Conces-
sions had to be made in many respects, but the 
outcome was frequently different from what 
was proclaimed. The legislation that was 
passed was frequently thwarted by obstruc-
tionist tactics and by the influence of powerful 
landed groups during implementation. Coloni-
zation schemes were fraught with difficulties; 
it was not necessarily the case that the land 
went to those in need, and projects generally 
involved a considerable degree of control over 
in Land Policies", in FAO, Documentation Prepared for 
the Center on Land Problems in Asia and the Far East, 
Rome 1955, pp. 61f; United Nations, LandReform: Defects 
in Agrarian Structure as a Bottleneck to Economic Devel-
opment, New York, 1951, p. 33. 
45KJ. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement..., op. cit., 1948, 
chapter IV. 
46United Nations, Progress in Land Reform: Second 
Report, New York, 1956, p. 10; and United Nations, Land 
Reform: Defects..., op. cit., 1951. Similar legislation can be 
found in the case of Burma (the Tenancy Act of 1938 and the 
Land Alienation Act of 1940) and in the Middle East. 
4,?See R. Stavenhagen (éd.), Agrarian Problems..., op. 
cit., 1970, and S. Barraclough and J. Collarte (eds.), Agrar-
ian Structure..., op. cit., 1973. 
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both the production and social life of the indi-
vidual setder.48 Finally, when the land was 
'mapped out* in the form of 'reserves', in the 
absence of other institutional changes it was 
concentrated in the hands of the 'well-to-do'.49 
In other cases is served to 'protect' the interests 
of European groups or to ensure a supply of 
labour for the mines and European estates.50 It 
was by no means the case that 'small-farmer' 
policies were based on a preoccupation and 
concern with 'the needs of the poor'. 
The twenty years immediately prior to 
1950 were marked by severe resentment of the 
inequalities that existed in access to land and to 
other opportunities and of paternalistic and 
generally repressive political regimes promot-
ing the very structures that had heightened this 
inequality. The pressures were such that many 
governments were forced to adjust their posi-
tion, and the result was often a stream of'small-
farmer' policies. 
The introduction of laws and distributive 
measures served (often very effectively) to give 
the impression that the government recognized 
and was tackling agrarian issues, but in practice 
the problems involved in ensuring effective 
enforcement were well beyond the technical 
capacity and inclination of governments and of 
the courts. Some laws could be supervised with 
a degree of success, but in many more cases 
measures were only approved at the national 
level on the tacit agreement that they would 
rarely, if ever, be rigorously enforced.51 
Once laws were passed, no matter how 
ineffective they were to prove in the course of 
time, they made the logic of further action that 
much more difficult. The underlying objective 
was revolution; to bring an end to foreign land 
ownership or destroy latifundismo rather than 
give rise to a concrete view of an alternative 
48See B. Farmer,P«meer Peasant..., op. cit., 1959, and 
K.J. Pelzer, Pioneer Settlement..., op. cit., 1948. 
49See Kew Tan, The Land and the Agricultural Or-
ganisation of Peninsular Malaya: A Historical Interpreta-
tion, Centre for Development Studies, Swansea, 1981, and 
D. Dunham, The Politics..., op. cit., 1982. 
50R. Chambers, Settlement Schemes..., op. cit., 1969, 
a.ndUnitedNatirms,LandReform:Defects...rop. cit., 1951. 
51On this see Solon Barraclough and Arthur Domike, 
"Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries", 
in R. Stavenhagen (éd.), Agrarian Structure..., op. cit., 
1970,pp.41f. 
society. It was essentially a pressure for change 
in the economic and political structure, and this 
could not be obtained through legislative re-
form.52 Only with the overthrow of colonial rule 
would small farmers be seen in a different 
light; nationalist leaders attentive to old in-
equalities and often struggling to establish ef-
fective control voiced a greater concern for 
'their countrymen' and for 'nation-building'. It 
was in this 'independence' era from the 1950s 
that the new States and those in Latin America 
began to develop a different economic model 
in which the priorities attached to the small-
farm sector were (if not always higher) at least 
different. 
2. The situation after 1950 
After 1950 many of the same contradictions 
continued, but they did so in a different polit-
ical climate and in the context of a rather dif-
ferent economic model. Thinking on economic 
policy was influenced by the situation of newly 
independent States of Africa, Asia and the Ca-
ribbean and by theories derived in the Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America. In both 
cases the image was one of 'underdeveloped 
countries' struggling to adjust their economic 
and political ties with advanced capitalist na-
tions. Industrialization was seen as the basis for 
'real* development, and the main body of ortho-
dox thinking on development strategies in-
creasingly emphasized large-scale (capital-in-
tensive) infrastructural investment and indus-
trialization. By the 1950s this was the basic 
model for economic growth.53 
On the other hand, few countries were 
actually in a position to undertake a major pro-
gramme of industrialization. In Latin America 
there had already been serious efforts. In Africa 
new States were striving to develop a rudimen-
52See Thomas Carrol, "The Land Reform Issue in 
Latin America", in Albert Hirschman (éd.), Latin American 
Issues, New York, 1961. 
5;
*There were also other arguments behind this line. 
No country had become rich or succeeded in achieving a 
significant improvement in standards of living without 
having industrialized. Industrialization was therefore rath-
er easily related to the idea of'development'. In other cases 
(such as Argentina and Brazil) the military was press-
ing for industrialization to sustain the country's military 
power and independence, 
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tary industrial base or else were pursuing so-
cialist experiments in an effort to make a clean 
break with their colonial past, but in neither 
case was there industrialization in a mean-
ingful sense outside South Africa. In Asia, Tai-
wan had undergone some industrialization un-
der Japanese rule to serve the needs of the 
Imperial war effort; Korea was beginning, but 
elsewhere war and the vicissitudes of national 
leaders made this a far less plausible proposi-
tion. It was only in India, and to a lesser extent 
Pakistan, that industrialization could be said to 
have become a major policy line. 
The finances needed to pay for industrial-
ization, and more especially to pay for im-
ported capital goods, basically had to come 
from three main sources: from external loans 
and investments by foreign capitalists; from in-
dustry itself; or from the export sector. With a 
few notable exceptions (such as Bolivia, Chile, 
Venezuela, Suriname and South Africa), it was 
the foreign exchange derived from agriculture 
that accounted for the greater part of the coun-
try's export earnings, though once industrial 
expansion was underway investment could 
come from the industrial sector itself. How-
ever, this was more likely when inputs from 
other sectors were relatively cheap compared 
to the price of industrial manufactures, and 
when the wages paid in the industrial sector 
were low in relation to industrial profits.54 
Which sources were to prove the more 
prominent, and how far agriculture was ex-
pected to bear the brunt of industrial expan-
sion, depended both on the structure of the 
given economy, and on the nature and structure 
of the political system.55 How far there was in 
practice a 'squeeze* on agriculture, and how far 
there was an alliance between the nascent in-
dustrial and the traditional rural bourgeoisie is 
difficult to sum up in a generalization. But what 
is clear is that, in as far as industrial policy 
needed changes in the rural sector, these were 
only possible with the emergence of politically 
powerful urban groups who had interests dif-
ferent from those of the landlord class, with the 
growth of electoral systems in which small 
^On this see R.B. Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevel-
opment, London, 1971. 
55See Ashok Mitra, Terms of Trade and Class Rela-
tions, London, 1977. 
farmers and propertyless groups had some 
voice, and with a situation in which industrial-
ization and falling prices in export markets 
weakened the importance of landed as against 
other forms of wealth. 
As industrialization (and with it urbaniza-
tion) progressed, demands on the agricultural 
sector began to change. There was pressure on 
the traditional export sector for foreign ex-
change to meet the increasing import bill; there 
was a growing demand for cheap inputs and 
cheap wage goods (principally food) in order to 
keep down costs in the industrial sector; there 
was increased demand for cheap labour (both 
in the urban areas and in capitalist agriculture) 
which had primarily to come from rural areas, 
and there was a need to expand the internal 
market for the manufactures that would be lo-
cally produced. Together these factors led to a 
different economic model, and one which 
looked at problems in rural areas and in agrar-
ian structures in a different light. 
With these demands, the constraints at 
work in the rural sector became more apparent. 
From the 1950s onwards per capita food pro-
duction and total food production per capita 
were growing at less than 1% per annum, and 
this rate was slowing down despite advances 
made in the so-called 'green revolution'.56 To-
tal population, and more particularly the urban 
population, was increasing rapidly, and the 
countries' export sectors were facing growing 
problems in international markets.57 Agricul-
ture was seen as a point of'internal strangula-
tion' —as the 'bottleneck' in economic devel-
opment— and increasing emphasis was placed 
on the need for balance between agriculture 
and other sectors.^A new approach to agricul-
tural development seemed needed. 
seSee Keith Griffin, "Agrarian Policy: The Political 
and Economic Context", World Development, Vol. I, No. 
11,1973. 
STSee United Nations, Concise Report on the World 
Population Situation in 1977, New York, 1979, pp. 62-69; 
Inter-American Development Bank, Latin America in the 
World Economy, Washington, D.C., 1975, chapter III, and 
CEPAL/FAO, "Situation and Evolution of Agriculture and 
Food Supplies in Latin America", Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vol. XIX, Nos. 1-2,1974. 
58See Raúl Prebisch, Hacia u*ia dinámica del desarro-
llo latinoamericano, CEPAL, Santiago, 1963; and United 
Nations, Land Reform: Defects in Agrarian Structure..., 
op. cit., 1951. 
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For all this, there was inevitably continuity 
in government policy. The export sector re-
mained an important one, albeit at times with 
different objectives, and often with struggles to 
control it through nationalization.59 In the sa-
vannah zone of West Africa and in Southern 
Africa, 'peripheral' regions were consciously 
undeveloped, receiving little by way of govern-
ment expenditure, in order to ensure an out-
flow of migrant labour. Wages in the capitalist 
sector were based on the subsistence costs of 
the single man; women, older men, the dis-
abled and children were cared for 'at home' in 
small-farming communities which in this way 
(in the absence of'social services') lowered the 
costs of labour in the industrial sector.60 This 
was a policy developed in the colonial period 
and retained because it facilitated develop-
ment of the 'modern' sector and because these 
structures simply could not be adjusted over-
night without undermining the country's eco-
nomic growth. 
However, the situation was changing and a 
number of broader considerations were being 
brought to bear. One of the these was the fear of 
communist infiltration. In the early 1950s the 
United States army was engaged in Korea, and 
in other Southeast Asian countries guerrilla 
wars were raging in rural areas. In Malaysia the 
British were fighting 'communist insurgency', 
the French were losing ground in Indo-China 
and the Philippines were considered to be un-
der dire threat.61 In Latin America the United 
States was trying to improve the climate for 
foreign private investment until the Cuban re-
volution led to reassessment of its position, 
All of this influenced western foreign pol-
icy. In Asia the inability of colonial and post-
colonial governments to provide enough food 
to feed their growing populations was consid-
ered to be the crux of the political issue. Amer-
59See the case of the West African Marketing Boards, 
the marketing of Taiwanese rice and Indonesian rubber, 
and more recently the nationalization of tea, rubber and 
coconut estates in Sri Lanka. 
^As the need became increasingly more for skilled 
labour, labour had to become more permanent to make 
training worthwhile. This in turn led to a shift in the pattern 
of migration, with more migration of women and of people 
moving as couples. 
61Harry Cleaver, "The Contradictions of the Green 
Revolution", Monthly Review, June 1972, p. 82. 
ican aid, other than military aid, was closely 
tied up with food and with food production, and 
one of its important weapons in this respect 
was the way it used its surplus food produc-
tion.62 Distinctive views were also beginning to 
emerge concerning the need for reform in the 
rural areas. "In country after country", wrote 
one observer,63 "one sees feudal classes bent 
on maintaining the status quo unsullied. They 
cannot gain popular support. They neither ben-
efit the rural community nor have they proved 
at all effective against communist penetration. 
They are the unwitting and unwilling allies of 
communism, for they are the creators of the 
revolutionary situation". 
It was clear that policies with regard to 
food production were developing definite po-
litical connotations. 
Regarding Latin America, in the wake of 
the Cuban experience, the choice was increas-
ingly seen as reform or revolution. President 
Kennedy insisted on various occasions that the 
promotion of democracy and reform were "the 
ultimate answer to Castro and the commu-
nists", and the Alliance for Progress placed 
particular stress on "economic growth, struc-
tural change and political democracy". The lat-
ter two were for a while a condition for Amer-
ican aid. 
In short, there were various strands to be 
observed in the policy lines that the Western 
bloc began adopting in response to capitalist 
interests in Third World countries and to what 
it saw as the threat of communist infiltration 
and of insurgency. The small-farmer policies 
that emerged in this period have to be seen in 
such a perspective, against the cold-war situa-
tion of the early 1960s and communist succes-
ses in Asia and Africa in the decade that fol-
lowed. Both dimensions —the importance of 
economic growth and political stability— influ-
enced strategic thinking on the small-farm sec-
tor, and both of them can be seen in the emer-
ging policy-lines. The most important of these 
concerned land reform, the opening up of new 
62On this see the evidence of Hubert Humphrey to the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Hearings 
on Policies and Operations ofP.L. 480,1957, p. 129. 
^Louis J. Walinksy (éd.), Agrarian Reform as Unfin-
ished Business: The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinski, 
New ifork, 1977, p. 134. 
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land, and the intensification of production in 
existing areas, and these three will each be 
discussed in turn, 
(a) The new perspectives on land reform 
With changes in the conventional develop-
ment model there was also a renewed interest in 
land reform, in abolishing 'quasi feudal' agrarian 
relations which were seen as a principal pro-
blem in the agricultural sector. In Asia the main 
bone of contention in rural areas was the exces-
sive rents extorted by absentee landlords who 
hoarded money, used it for conspicuous con-
sumption, or else re-invested it in other sectors. 
The shortage of capital and the general air of 
insecurity surrounding tenancy arrangements 
meant little capital investment in agriculture 
and little scope for increasing productivity. In 
such cases land reform was to be seen as 'land 
to the tiller' and the abolition of an absentee 
rentier class and of an intermediary group of 
rent collectors, with the basic unit of produc-
tion remaining the same. 
In Latin America the situation was differ-
ent. There was concentration of ownership and 
a great deal of power in large estates which had 
vast areas of underutilized or even unused 
land, while the vast majority of agricultural 
families had no land at all.64 In this context land 
reform implied reorganization —the consolida-
tion of small and fragmented units or the sub-
division and redistribution of existing estates. 
In either case it required new units of man-
agement; land reform meant the disruption of 
earlier production patterns and in the short-
term at least it seemed likely to lead to lower 
levels of production. Land reform therefore 
had different implications. 
In all areas a crucial part of the whole land 
reform issue was of course the balance of po-
litical power in particular countries, and the 
^ S e e FAO, Perspective Study of Agricultural Devel-
opment in Latin America, Vol. I, Rome, 1972, pp. 1-23; S. 
Barraclough and J. Collarte, Agrarian Structure..., op. cit., 
1973, Table 2-1, p. 16; Anthony Bottomley, "Planning in a 
Underuti l ised Economy: The Case of Ecuador", Social and 
Economic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1966; and CEPAL, "An 
Agricultural Policy to Expedite the Economic Develop-
men t of Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, Vol. IV, No. 2,1961. 
composition of the group that was pushing for 
change had much to do with the possibilities of 
ultimate success. In the Middle East many of 
the large landowners were viewed as collab-
orators with the colonial regime and they were 
eventually ousted by a coalition of urban-based 
groups and small producers under that ban-
ner.6 5^ Venezuela and Peru small farmers and 
landless workers invaded estates and the gov-
ernment later ratified their action by land re-
forms after the fact (as had also occurred in 
Mexico and Bolivia). In all of these cases (and 
more generally elsewhere) land reform was 
used to confirm and to stabilize an already ac-
complished political change. Later, in the 
shadow of the Cuban revolution, the agree-
ment of Punta del Este and the Alliance for 
Progress, the United States exerted consider-
able pressure on other governments in Latin 
America to introduce some measure of land 
reform, but the extent to which this occurred 
was very limited because the dominant polit-
ical interests were very wary of change. 
Finally, when land reform measures were 
introduced and an emphasis was placed on re-
distribution and on 'small-farmer' policies, 
they had to serve what the new leaders consid-
ered to be the needs of'national development'. 
The small-farm sector was generally seen as 
something that required a good deal of control 
and supervision, encouraging farmers to 'mod-
ernize' their production, to raise their incomes 
and to contribute to the needs of people in the 
urban centres and in other sectors. It also im-
plied that the State itself should play an in-
creasing role in guiding the production and 
marketing of peasants' crops. 
This tendency and some of the implica-
tions of it are perhaps best illustrated from in-
dividual cases. In Egypt, for example, there 
were a series of land and land tenure reforms 
following the overthrow of the ancien régime in 
1952.66 The country's agrarian structure had 
previously been one in which there was a high 
degree of concentration in the ownership of 
650n this see Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Prin-
ciple and Practice, Oxford, 1969, p . 12. 
^ F o r a specification of these reforms see Mahmoud 
Abdel-Fadíl , Development, Income Distribution and So-
cial Change in Rural Egypt 1952-70, Cambridge, 1975, 
chapter 1. 
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land. Some 94% of all owners had plots of less 
than 2.1 hectares (5 feddans); rents were high, 
accounting for as much as 75% of the net in-
come that sharecroppers or tenant farmers de-
rived from their land, and it was more advan-
tageous for absentee landlords to lease their 
land than to cultivate it themselves. There had 
emerged a whole structure of intermediaries 
between owner and tenant, and with it 'a whole 
hierarchy of tenures' on the same piece of 
land.67 
By 1950 poverty and exploitation were 
such that there was considerable tension and 
unrest in the countryside. The leaders of the 
July coup were conscious of this, of the need to 
destroy the power of the landlord class and to 
win the support of tenant farmers and landless 
groups. Agrarian reforms68 "were welcomed by 
the 'enlightened' business circles in Egypt as 
timely measures, long overdue, to redirect in-
vestment into industry and to avert the risk of a 
more radical solution to the agrarian question, 
which was looming large on the horizon". 
The result was a redistribution of some 
8.5% of the country's land area to medium and 
small producers and the introduction of ten-
ancy regulations giving legal status to tenants 
and sharecroppers on other land.69 At the same 
time, beneficiaries were obliged to form co-
operatives. These were seen as a means of con-
solidating farms to take advantage of the econo-
mies of scale that were needed for 'modern' 
production, and they represented a systematic 
attempt on the part of the State to establish 
tighter supervision and control of small-farmer 
production. An important element in this was 
the introduction of compulsory sales to govern-
ment agencies at 'administered prices' well be-
low those in the open market.70 
67M. Abdel-Fadil, ibid., pp. 5-6, and G.S. Saab, Egyp-
tian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962, London, 1967. 
^Abdel -Fadi l , Development..., op. cit., 1975, p . 22. 
See also National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. 
V, No. 3,1952, p . 167. 
6 9 See Sayed Marei, "The Agrarian Reforms in Egypt", 
International Labour Review, vol. LXIX, No. 2,1954, and 
Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, London, 1957, p . 39. The tenancy regulations 
were in fact the more important element, since they in-
c luded rent reductions, minimum wage legislation and se-
curity of tenure for very large part of the population. 
7 0 See Samir Radwan and Eddy Lee, "The State and 
Another example was that of South Korea, 
which undertook a series of land reforms be-
tween 1948 and 1957. In 1945 half of the coun-
try's cultivated land was controlled by only 4% 
of all rural families and a further 20% of the 
arable land was in Japanese hands.71 Tenants 
were in a precarious situation, and this was only 
made worse with the advent of civil war. With 
the end of the Korean war this land was ap-
propriated and given to those who were farm-
ing it to increase production in support of the 
policy of industrialization and to remove rural 
discontent on which the communists could 
play. 
Between 1963 and 1973 output in the in-
dustrial sector rose by 17% p.a. and industrial 
employment by over 9% p.a. This created a 
sharp increase in the demand for food, but to 
maintain this dynamic it was important to keep 
industrial wages down. Compulsory State pro-
curement of rice and barley was retained after 
the war, the Government maintaining control 
of marketing and of the supply of 'modern' in-
puts to the small-farm sector.72 This was again 
in practice done by means of co-operatives. 
The rural sector bore the brunt of the indus-
trialization policy through the low procure-
ment prices that were being offered. As yields 
increased, so too did incomes, but not as fast as 
the rural cost of living. The terms of trade were 
turned against agriculture, and real household 
incomes (while rather unstable) were more or 
less unchanged until the 1970s.73The reforms 
Agricultural Change; a Case Study of Egypt 1952-1977", in 
Dharam Gai, Azizur Khan, Eddy Lee and Samir Radwan, 
Agrarian Systems and Development, London, 1979, p . 169. 
"^Robert Morrow and Kenneth Sherper, "Land Reform 
in South Korea", United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Spring Review of Land Reform, 
June 1970, p. 6. 
7 2 E d d y Lee, "Egalitarian Peasant Farming and Rural 
Development: the case of Korea", in Dharam Gai et al, 
Agrarian Systems..., op. cit. 1979, p . 29. See also Pal Yong 
Moon and Byung Seo Ruy, Korea's Agricultural Policies in 
Historical Perspective, Seoul, Korean Development In-
stitute, April 1977. 
7 3See Lee, "Egalitarian Peasant Farming...", op. cit., 
1979, table 2.3, p . 31 and Y.K. Ro, D.N. Adams and L.J. 
Hushak, " Income Instability and Consumption-Savings 
in South Korean Farm Households, 1965-70", World De-
velopment, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1981. This trend was 
partly mitigated by the high level of job creation in the 
urban sector. 
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created an apparently egalitarian rural struc-
ture, but small farmers as a class were being 
exploited in order to meet the needs of indus-
trialization. 
In Latin America after the Cuban revolu-
tion there were again fierce debates about land 
reform. Governments, preoccupied with indus-
trial development and with the need to keep 
'peasant' movements under firm control, were 
faced with both internal and external pressure 
to introduce some measures of reform in the 
rural areas. In Chile landowners had power and 
patronage over small farmers and rural 
workers, and with a growing interest in 'mod-
ernization' there was a political battle to break 
this influence and gain control of the rural 
vote.74 In Peru there was rural unrest in the late 
1950s as repressive measures were introduced 
by the military government to increase its con-
trol. In the wake of this the need for agrarian 
reform was increasingly recognized and was to 
become an important element in the Govern-
ment's economic strategy. The Agrarian Re-
form Law of 1969 expropriated large estates, 
broadening and consolidating the position of 
'progressive' farmers operating on a small-to-
medium or medium scale and forcing them to 
work through a State-controlled co-operative 
system.75 
A similar pattern can be seen in a great 
many other cases —in the Zamindari reforms in 
India, in the Taiwan reforms of the early 1950s, 
or the Pakistani reforms of 195S?6— reflected 
the needs of economic growth and of political 
control in the countries in question, and they 
were aimed at reinforcing (or at reconfirming) 
an already accomplished shift in the balance of 
power away from the traditional rural landown-
ing class. To achieve this there was often need 
?4See David Lehmann, "Agrarian Reform in Chile 
1965-72: An Essay in Contradictions", in David Lehmann 
(éd.), Agrarian Reform and Agrarian Reformism, London, 
1974, and James Petra and Maurice Zeitlin, "Agrarian Rad-
icalism in Chile", in R. Stavenhagen (éd.), Agrarian Prob-
lems..., op. cit., 1970. 
75See Ramón Zaldívar, "Agrarian Reform and Military 
Reformism in Peru", in Lehmann (éd.), Agrarian Reform..., 
op. cit., 1974. 
76On the Taiwan case, see Raymond Apthorpe, "The 
Burden of Land Reform: An Asian Model of Land Reform 
Re-analysed", in Development of Societies: the Next 
Twenty-Five Years, The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, 
1979. 
for the small farmers' support. Many gained 
land and saw a significant improvement in their 
standards of living. However, this did not ne-
cessarily imply any serious interest in the poor-
est farmers nor any long-term commitment to 
offer them help. The reforms often led to an-
other type of social differentiation and at times 
a swing to large-scale production in another 
form. 
(b) The opening-up of new land as a policy 
instrument 
Many land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s 
were important in facilitating capitalist growth, 
even though —particularly in Asia— a great many 
small farmers gained ownership of land. The 
advances that were made were rarely thorough-
going and the rate at which they were imple-
mented in practice was slower than the increas-
ing ïandlessness in rural areas.77 Population 
growth, concentration of land ownership in the 
'modern' sector and the increasing mechaniza-
tion of larger units were heightening resent-
ments and forcing people to look for employ-
ment in other areas. 
The 1960s saw a dramatic increase in ur-
ban population, to such an extent that there 
were often serious problems of urban conges-
tion, poverty and violence, associated with 
what was to be called 'the informal sector'. 
There was concern with lowering the rate of 
rural-urban migration, and recognition that 
land reforms would have to be supplemented 
with other measures that would help to defuse 
potential political threats and to improve na-
tional agricultural production. There was often 
a very real need to produce more food, and one 
means of facilitating these objectives was to 
open up 'new lands* in 'underutilized areas'. 
Since somebody (and not always the State) 
had a claim on the land in almost all of these 
areas, the dividing line between coloniza-
77In the 1960s 1,0-1.2 million landless families ac-
quired lands from government agencies in Latin America. 
This was the equivalent of about 100 000 families a year. At 
the same time, the number of potential beneficiaries was 
estimated to be 10 million families, and the growth of the 
rural labour force was estimated to be about 500 000 
workers per year. See CEPAL/FAO, Situation and Evolu-
tion..., op. cit., 1974, p. 107. 
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tion and agrarian reform was both subtle and 
blurred. The former was seen, and at times 
officially recognized, as being a practical alter-
native to agrarian reform.78 In many parts of the 
world the good land still available was ex-
tremely limited —far more so than had been 
believed a decade before. In parts of Asia (Sri 
Lanka) and Africa (the Sahelian region) the 
opening up of new land was still important, but 
in other areas in Asia (India) and Latin America 
it was slowing down.79 The process of coloniza-
tion proved slow and difficult, and especially 
when it required irrigation facilities it also 
proved an expensive policy alternative.80 
Such were the costs of reclaiming semi-
arid areas and controlling supplies of water that 
opening up new land rarely offered any real 
solution to the problems of overpopulated rural 
areas or to the extremely high rates of rural-
urban migration. Colonization, rather than land 
reform, more aptly describes many of the 
changes that took place following agrarian re-
form in Central and South America, involving 
the 'spontaneous' invasion of underutilized 
areas or government-sponsored schemes in 
outlying areas.81 In Asia there were a number of 
large-scale projects (such as the settlement of 
200 000 small farmers in the Mahaweli basin) 
dependent on elaborate and extremely expen-
sive irrigation facilities.82 But their impact on 
78This was clearly the case in Brazil, where the Gov-
ernment worked through an Institute of Colonization and 
Agrarian Reform. 
79In the first two decades of Indian planning emphasis 
was placed on extending the cultivated area through land 
reclamation, soil conservation schemes, the introduction of 
improved dry farming methods and irrigation. The costs 
were such, however, that the emphasis had to shift to in-
troducing more intensive methods of production (see 
Biplap Dasgupta, Agrarian Change and the New Technol-
ogy in India, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD), Geneva, 1971, pp. 16-17. In Latin 
America the harvested area increased by 2.6% p.a. in the 
first 5 years of the 1960s and by 1.3% p.a. in the next 5 years, 
but in the first 5 years of the 1970s it was increasing by only 
0.5% p.a. (see CEPAL/FAO, Situation and Evolution..,, op. 
cit., 1974, p. 101). 
^See Michael Nelson, The Development of Tropical 
Lands, Baltimore, 1973, and IBRD, Agricultural Land Set-
tlement, A World Bank Issues Paper, Washington, D,C, 
January 1978, p. 5. 
81William Thiesenhusen, "Colonization: Alternative 
or Supplement to Agrarian Reform", in Peter Dorner (éd.), 
Land Reform in Latin America: Issues and Cases, Land 
Tenure Center, Wisconsin, 1971. 
82See D. Dunham, "The Politics...", op. cit. 
the structure and output of the agricultural sec-
tor (and the social and political problems con-
tained within it) was disappointingly small. 
Secondly, even in areas or regions where 
colonization was important, it did not always 
work in the interests of small producers. The 
costs involved and the desire to establish tight 
control over peasant production were such that 
in government-sponsored projects the earlier 
pattern of close supervision was firmly main-
tained. What emerged was often a highly cen-
tralized system of management remarkably like 
that of a plantation or a large corporation. One 
study of colonization schemes in Chile found 
that a large proportion (44%) of settlers on 12 
projects prior to 1962 were professional people, 
people engaged in some form of business, peo-
ple who worked with the Caja de Colonización 
Agrícola or other government agencies, or peo-
ple who had been working for them at one time 
or another.83 In Nicaragua it was common prac-
tice for livestock farmers prior to the revolution 
to lease areas of woodland to would-be settlers, 
allow them to clear the land, plant an annual 
crop (such as rice, maize or beans) and with it 
pasture. The latter took over when the crop 
was harvested; the land reverted back to the 
owner who now had a use for it, and the settlers 
were pushed out to "open up" areas further 
afield.84Elsewhere, despite official accounts of 
'boundless resources', colonists gained little 
more than semi-arid or otherwise marginal 
'frontier' land that offered no attraction to more 
powerful groups. 
When it came to competition for better 
land, small producers and other subsistence 
groups were in practice physically expelled (or 
displaced by the use of threats) unless they had 
the protection and support of the Government. 
In many areas this was not forthcoming, and 
such was the concern with 'modernization' that 
preference was given to large-scale, capital-in-
^W, Thiesenhusen, "Colonization,..", op. cit., 1971, 
footnote 2 on p. 211. 
84James Taylor Jr., Agricultural Settlement and Devel-
opment in Eastern Nicaragua, Land Tenure Center, Wis-
consin, 1969. On this subject see also Orlando Fais Borda, 
La cuestión agraria en Colombia, Bogotá, 1976, and his 
discussion of "Ja ley de los tres pasos". A comparable 
example of this process can be seen in the Oriente Region 
of Bolivia. 
156 CEPAL REVIEW No. 18 / December 1982 
tensive forms of production. "There is evi-
dence", wrote one observer of the Brazilian 
case in the mid-1970s,85 "that large companies 
attempting to 'develop' Amazonia are pre-emp-
ting peasants' attempts to settle the region, and 
in some cases evicting 'squatters' who have 
lived there for generations". 
Similar cases of displacement on varying 
scales can be observed in the Llanos Orientales 
of Colombia,86 in the Sahelian region,87 on Min-
danao,88 and in the north-eastern lowlands of 
Ethiopia.89 In fact it seems to have been a fairly 
typical feature of 'frontier' development, with 
little concern for the small farmers, subsistence 
cultivators or nomadic pastoralists living in 
these areas. 
And yet, it would be wrong to give the 
impression that the opening-up of new lands 
was invariably characterized by physical dis-
placement or savage exploitation of subsis-
tence cultivators and nomadic herdsmen. This 
has often occurred. But in many other cases 
small farmers have managed to gain access to 
land, and many of them have prospered as a 
result. The more important point is that open-
ing up new lands could never offer a lasting 
solution to the serious agrarian problems in 
other parts of the country. To some extent it 
provided a safety valve by making available 
more land and creating more employment, but 
more generally (and more significantly) it 
served a political function by giving govern-
ments time and by helping them meet the con-
ditions of aid-donor countries. 
(c) 'Modernization of agricultural production 
The third policy line was the moderniza-
85Martin Katzman, "The Brazilian Frontier in Compar-
ative Perspective", Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 17, No. 3,1975, p. 282. 
^Over the last decade several examples of this can be 
iound recorded in the main Colombia daily newspapers El 
Tiempo and El Espectador. 
87See Comité d'Information Sahel, Qui se Nourrit de 
la Famine en Afrique?, Paris, 1975, and Claude Meillas-
soux, "Development or Exploitation: is the Sahel Famine a 
Food Business?", Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol. 1, No. 1,1974. 
88K. Griffin, Agrarian Policy..., op. cit., 1973, 
p. 9. 
SSLars Bondestam, "People and Capitalism in the 
North-Eastern Lowlands of Ethiopia", Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3,1974. 
tion' of production in the areas already in use. 
This was to be a principal thrust of policy from the 
1960s: an effort on the part of advanced capitalist 
and Third World countries to raise the agricultu-
ral productivity of the latter by introducing 'ad-
vanced' mechanical equipment, 'modern' in-
puts and 'modern' management methods. This 
shift to more commercialized forms of agricul-
tural production was to be promoted through a 
system of subsidized prices, by ensuring that 
the capital needed was made available 
(through agricultural development banks, 
fanners'associations or co-operatives), with the 
Government providing infrastructure, advice 
and supervision as and when it was needed. 
In this way producers would gain access to 
new technology, the market for farm equip-
ment and for manufactured inputs could be ex-
tended, and the increased purchasing power of 
rural areas would widen the market for manu-
factured consumer goods. However, when it 
came to intensifying production in existing 
areas the influence of agrarian structures was 
invariably strong. 
The mechanization of large-scale agricul-
ture and the increased use of new seeds and 
other inputs that characterized the so-called 
'Green Revolution' involved different pro-
cesses, and yet they reflect a great many fea-
tures in common. Both saw the involvement of 
large-scale (and generally foreign) commercial 
interests. Mechanization entailed the transfer 
of established, relatively capital-intensive farm 
technologies from Europe and North America 
to Third World locations. With the possible ex-
ception of Argentina (and in the view of certain 
authorities parts of Brazil), the mechanization 
of agriculture in Latin America has been pro-
moted and guided by business interests with 
much use of credit to speed up its adoption; 
they showed little interest in adapting equip-
ment to local conditions, and even less to pro-
moting its use on smaller farms or in different 
systems of agricultural production.90 
This mechanization had a considerable 
««CEPAL/FAO, Situation and Evolution..., op. cit., 
1974, p. 105. On this trend see also CEPAL/FAO, La ex-
pansión selectiva de la producción agropecuaria en Améri-
ca Latina, E/CN. 12/378/Rev. 2 (United Nations publica-
tion, Sales No.: 1957. II. G. 4). 
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amount of government support. In the mid-
1960s over a third of loans granted by the Agri-
cultural Development Bank in Pakistan were 
for the purchase of tractors and other mechani-
cal equipment.91 The Government of India 
adopted a liberal stand on the import of tractors, 
and in turn encouraged their local production 
in co-operation with multinational firms.92 Not 
only tractors but also power tillers, combined 
harvesters, mechanized threshers and irriga-
tion facilities of various kinds were purchased 
from international commercial concerns on 
government credit. 
Nor have the inputs associated with the 
'Green Revolution' been any more divorced 
from commercial pressures. New strains of 
wheat and rice were developed with the sup-
port of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, 
and promoted by an aid lobby in which com-
mercial interests of various kinds were well 
represented.93 In Jalisco, Mexico, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
looked for ways in which foreign private invest-
ment could provide the necessary inputs for 
small producers and then market their product 
(in this case maize).94 The ESSO company was 
engaged in the distribution of fertilizers in the 
Philippines, and efforts were made to promote 
foreign investment in fertilizer production in 
other parts of the world.* 
North American and European agribusi-
ness had the interest and the capital as well as 
the technology to provide the equipment and 
the inputs to bring about modernization of agri-
cultural production. In many (though by no 
means all) countries, the emerging policy was 
to be 'good for business'; profit motives influ-
91Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian 
Change, London, 1974, p. 53. 
92Biplap Dasgupta, Agrarian Change and the New 
Technology in India, United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, Geneva, 1977, p. 98. 
^ T h e International Centre for the Improvement of 
Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT) in Mexico and the Interna-
tional Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines 
were both set up under the auspices of United States 
foundations. 
94H. Cleaver, The Contradictions..., op. cit., 1972, 
p. 90. 
95Ibid. Efforts were made to encourage foreign invest-
ment in fertilizer production in India. 
enced views as to what should be done, often to 
the disadvantage of the small producers.96 
Secondly, the cost of'modern' equipment, 
irrigation facilities and other inputs was such 
that, regardless of the attitudes of the suppliers, 
they were confined to a comparatively small 
proportion of the nation's producers. Access to 
credit (and thereby to new technology) was in 
general so costly, or at least so restricted, that 
the medium-sized and large fanners were the 
main beneficiaries. In India in the early 1970s 
the price of a Hindustan 35HP tractor was Rs 
27 000 and a Massey-Ferguson Rs 35 000, if 
they could be obtained. This was some thirty to 
forty times the net annual income to be derived 
from a five acre farm operated with bullocks in 
parts of the Punjab.97 
Large farmers used their influence to ac-
quire loans and to move up or bypass the wait-
ing lists, and those who were able to obtain 
equipment and inputs saw an increase in yields 
and, in turn, of income. In the Punjab one study 
found the average net income per hectare in 
canal irrigated areas to be Rs 459 on farms using 
bullock power, and Rs 923 on those using trac-
tors.98 No doubt these farms differed in more 
ways than just the level of mechanization, but 
statistics of this kind do serve to show the dif-
ferentiation occurring in particular areas and 
the widening gap in income and wealth be-
tween those who 'modernized' their produc-
tion and those who could not. 
In areas of sharecropping or tenant farming 
the prospect of higher profits led landlords to 
show greater interest in commercial produc-
tion. No doubt this has helped smaller farmers 
get access to inputs by way of their landlord, 
but it also resulted in many areas in the latter 
taking decisions about land use, varieties to be 
^The enormous profits sometimes ascribed to these 
enterprises were by no means assured, though there seems 
little doubt that there was often a considerable amount of 
money to be gained from the sales of equipment, licenses 
and inputs of various kinds. 
97Â.S. Kahlon and S.S. Grewal, "Farm Mechanisation 
in a Labour Abundant Economy", Economic and Political 
Weekly, 13 May 1972. 
98A.S. Kahlon, S.S. Miglani and S.K. Metha, Studies in 
the Economics of Farm Management, Ferozepore District 
(Punjab), New Delhi, Ministry of Agriculture, 1972. 
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grown and the inputs used." In such cases the 
tenant became more a farm worker than an in-
dependent farmer, and tenancy was merely a 
convenient arrangement enabling the landlord 
to pass on production risks. In West Godavari 
rents paid by sharecroppers in the dry season 
more than doubled with the introduction of 
high-yielding varieties, and the net share of the 
tenant suffered a marked decrease.100In other 
areas (for example parts of Java) small-holdings 
were increasingly leased to 'progressive' farm-
ers and there was a mounting concentration of 
control (if not necessarily of ownership) often-
anted land.101 In yet other areas owners took 
back their land from tenants to cultivate it 
themselves or to give it to sons, increasing the 
numbers of landless people.102 In all these 
cases institutional arrangements made it ex-
tremely difficult for small farmers to improve 
their relative position. 
In the view of some, the overall result was 
essentially a negative one. The efforts made 
were cynically dismissed as "a systematic and 
coordinated effort to organise a 'pampered', 
small, efficient and highly subsidised sector of 
rich landowners and producers".103 And cer-
tainly there is evidence to that effect. Policies 
showed a definite 'landlord bias'.104 The cases 
of India and Pakistan have already been cited, 
but in countries with more conservative polit-
ical regimes the situation was often a good deal 
worse. In Iran an Agricultural Development 
" O n this see K. Griffin, The Political Economy..., op. 
cit., 1974. 
100G. Parthasarathy, "West Godavari: Andhra Pra-
desh", in IRRI, Changes in Rice Farming in Selected Areas 
of Asia, Manila, 1975, p. 66. 
101 Ingrid Palmer, The New Rice in Indonesia, United 
Nations Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Ge-
neva, 1976, pp. 137-138. 
102Jean G, Rosenberg and David A. Rosenberg, Land-
less Peasants and Rural Poverty in Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines, Cornell University Rural Development Com-
mittee, Ithaca, N.V., February 1980, pp. 29 f. 
103Ernst Feder, "The New World Bank Programme 
and the Self-Liquidation of the Third World Peasantry", 
Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. XIX, Nos. 1-2,1974, p. 348, 
and Ernst Feder, "Agribusiness and the Elimination of 
Latin America's Rural Proletariat", World Development, 
Vol. 5, Nos. 5-7, 1977. On the package approach, see also 
Emiliano Ortega, "Peasant agriculture in Latin America: 
situations and trends", CEPAL Review, No. 16, April 1982, 
pp. 75f. 
l04See. K. Griffin, The Political Economy..., op. cit., 
1974. 
Fund was established in 1968 to finance large-
scale production on highly mechanized farms 
and to assist agribusiness in bringing this 
about. The minimum loan available was US$ 
67 000 (five million rials), well beyond the 
dreams of any small farmer. The Banco do Bra-
sil for its part, was offering at that time a mini-
mum loan of some fifty times the annual earn-
ings of an industrial worker.105 
Loans for new seeds and 'modern' inputs 
were naturally lower, and credit was available 
in smaller amounts. Its provision was an es-
sential part of 'modernization' programmes, 
but who acquired it was really the important 
issue.106 Generally speaking it was the medi-
um-sized or large fanner who could better af-
ford to experiment with new varieties and to try 
expensive inputs.107 These people were nor-
mally (though not always) the first adopters, 
and it was they who were likely to take ad-
vantage of the subsidized prices designed to 
encourage farmers to 'modernize' their produc-
tion. 
Small farmers saw that they could raise 
their output and hence their income, and the 
technology spread.108 As it did, so the cost of 
subsidizing the growing quantity of inputs 
needed also increased: it became an increasing 
burden upon the exchequer, and it was often 
reduced (or even removed) just as small farm-
ers were adopting these new techniques.109 
Since small fanners were more likely to sow the 
whole of their plot with new varieties, when 
the subsidy declined (and the petroleum crisis 
raised the price of chemical fertilizers) it was 
they who found themselves in the most vulner-
able position.110 
Í05K. Griffin, Agrarian Policy..., op. cit., 1973, pp. lOf. 
106
 On the importance of credit as a part of the "pack-
age" arrangements that were beingmade see United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), Spring 
Review of Small-Farmer Credit, Vol. XIX, June 1973. 
107On this see K. Griffin, The Political Economy..., op. 
cit., 1975; Dasgrupta, Agrarian Change..., op. cit., 1977; 
IRRI, Changes in Rice Farming..., op. cit., 1975; and ARTI, 
The Agrarian Situation Relating to Paddy Cultivation in 
Five Selected Districts of Sri Lanka (five volumes and main 
report), Colombo, 1975. 
108
 On this pattern of diffusion of innovations see the 
UNRISD studies on the 'Green Revolution'. 
109IBRD, World Bank Operations, op. cit., 1972, p. 17. 
110The tendency for small farmers to adopt innovations 
later and to sow the whole of their area with new varieties is 
noted in IRRI, Changes in Rice Farming..., op. cit., 1975. 
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This is not to say that small farmers were 
always exploited or that 'modernization' only 
served the interests of a privileged class of me-
dium-sized and large farmers. In India alone it 
has been estimated that as many as six million 
small-farmer households may have benefitted 
from the efforts of the Small Farmer Develop-
ment Agency, and that there was at times as 
much as a 33% increase in household in-
come. 1U These figures may (to say the least) be 
rather flattering, but they serve to give an en-
couraging indication of the scale on which ben-
efits have occurred. 
The point is that the proportion of small 
farmers involved was, with the exception of 
certain areas, extremely small. In India there 
were over 70 million rural households who 
qualified as 'small farmers* under the defini-
tions of the Small Farmer Development Agen-
cy.112 Secondly, the 'Green Revolution' was at 
best a wheat and a rice 'revolution'; it was in-
troduced to relatively few and comparatively 
small regions, and it only applied to certain 
parts of the world. Very little was done for the 
development of tubers. 
Thirdly, 'modernization' in practice meant 
promotion of commercialized agriculture. The 
logic of the process was such that it led to in-
creasing economic and social differentiation. 
New techniques were introduced into an al-
ready unequal agrarian structure and they inev-
itably had an unequal impact within the com-
munity. It was easier for officials to work with 
those who had power than to work against 
them; it was easier to deal with larger-scale 
farmers than to work with a mass of illiterate 
small producers, and this also created a bias in 
delivery systems.113 
And yet, from the point of view of a govern-
111
 Reserve Bank of India, Marginal Farmers and Agri-
cultural Development Agencies: a Field Study, Bombay, 
1976. On the income estimates see Raj Krishna, "Small 
Farmer Development", Economic and Political Weekly, 26 
May 1979. 
U2The Indian Agricultural Census 1970-71, quoted in 
Krishna, "Small-Farmer Development", op. cit., 1979, p. 
913. 
I13On this subject see for example L. Cliffe, J.S. Cole-
man and M.R. Doornbos (eds.), Government and Rural De-
velopment in East Africa, The Hague, 1977, and S. Wil-
liams and J.A. Miller, Credit Systems for Small-Scale 
Farmers: Case Studiesfrom Mexico, Austin, Texas, 1973. 
ment's underlying objectives this policy of 
agricultural modernization was not necessarily 
unsuccessful as far as it went. In global terms 
there was no marked increase in output per 
capita. U4Once the people in these pockets of 
'modern production' were more or less satu-
rated with modern inputs and modern technol-
ogy, the growth in the rate of output began to 
drop off. 'Traditional' agrarian structures re-
emerged as a barrier to continuing this rate of 
growth. 
But in particular areas the gains were often 
considerable, and sometimes sufficient to have 
had some impact in macro terms. This was true 
in the Punjab and in large parts of the Philip-
pines. More generally, this policy gave land to 
many small peasants and increased incomes 
while strengthening a class of 'progressive' 
farmers whose economic and political interests 
were generally in tune with those prevailing at 
the national level. The introduction of 'land-
lord-biased' or at least 'progressive-farmer-bi-
ased' innovations created or strengthened a 
class of rural producers who were loyal to (and 
dependent on) the government in power: a 
class which had considerable influence in rural 
areas (though not enough to pose a political 
threat), and whose interests generally favoured 
the status quo. In this sense these policies 
served these governments' interest in 'political 
stability'. 
The culmination of this 'modernization 
era: the 1970s 
The situation by the middle of the 1970s was 
by no means a promising one. There had 
been no great breakthrough in agricultural de-
velopment as a result of this modernization and 
the 'Green Revolution'. On the contrary, in all 
parts of the Third World except the Far East the 
rate of growth in agricultural output was slower 
than it had been in the previous decade.115 In 
no region had there been any real acceleration 
in food production of sufficient dimensions to 
influence macro figures of die type that are 
1I4K\Griffin, Agrarian Policy..., op. cit., 1973, p. 3. 
115See. K. Griffin, The Political Economy..., op. cit., 
2nd éd., 1979, pp. 4f. 
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regularly issued by the FAO.116 What is more, 
in certain areas —most notably the Sahel— 
food production and marketing seemed an 
almost desperate issue. 
In most areas the situation continued to be 
one in which large farms, often run with the use 
of 'sub-optimum' methods, were predomi-
nant.117 The advances made in land reform had 
been far slower than the rate of increasing 
landlessness, and the opening-up of new land 
was not only limited, but difficult and expen-
sive. Nor had everyone gained from the process 
of'modernization'. In fact it seemed quite like-
ly that the vast majority of small peasant pro-
ducers were not included in it. The process 
resulted in new forms of differentiation: often it 
led to the concentration of land (or of control of 
land), and at times it was creating landlessness, 
raising unemployment and increasing poverty. 
With the displacement of small producers 
from the better soils and high rates of popula-
tion growth in poor rural areas there had 
emerged an increasingly marginalized popula-
tion 'dumped' into a minifundio (or subsis-
tence) type of production.118 Problems of un-
employment had become very severe, and by 
the 1970s the causal tie with absolute poverty 
had been clearly discerned.119 Many people 
Since the 1950s shifts in the emphasis of think-
ing on economic policy have been reflected in 
the position adopted by the World Bank Group, 
116
 Mos notably The State of Food and Agriculture 
reports. 
117Regarding the situation in Latin America, see 
CEPAL/FAO, Situation and Evolution..., op. cit., 1974. 
i l 8See for example CEPAL/FAO, Situation and Evo-
lution..., op. cit., 1974; Orlando Fais Borda, El hombre y la 
tierra en Boyacá: Desarrollo histórico de una sociedad 
minifundista, revised edition, Bogotá, 1973; Emilio Klein, 
Diferenciación social: Tendencias del empleo y los ingre-
sos agrícolas, PREALC, Santiago, 1980; K. Griffin, Land 
Concentration and Rural Poverty, London, 1976; and ILO, 
Poverty and Rural Landlessness..., op. cit., 1977. 
l i 9See for example CEPAL, "Basic Aspects of Latin 
American Development Strategy", Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1969, pp. 3-42 (United Nations publication: 
Sales N.° E.71.II.G.1); and CEPAL/ILPES, The State of 
Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean, Guatemala, 
1980, pp. 198f. 
were living in precarious circumstances.120 The 
situation was frequently one of considerable 
social tension, resulting in protest movements, 
at times in violence, and often in resort to re-
pressive measures.121 
Although these were often no more than 
pockets of disturbance, a number of other fac-
tors were beginning to play a significant role 
and were putting events in a somewhat differ-
ent light. First was the sharp increase in the 
price of oil and of oil derivatives, including 
chemical fertilizers. Secondly, there was an in-
crease in world food prices, and with a series of 
droughts and biased distribution systems short-
ages of food were recorded in many parts of the 
world. Thirdly, there was at the same time a 
general decline in the price of many Third 
World export crops on international markets. 
The need for food imports was often of such 
proportions that balance of payments problems 
loomed high on the horizon; there was fear of 
Cuban and Russian influence in parts of Africa 
and of communist influence extending out-
wards from Indo-China, and in this context 
small-farmer policies (and particularly those 
that were oriented towards food production) 
were considered of greater importance to the 
capitalist world. 
the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID), FAO, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IDB) and other bilateral and 
multilateral 'development' agencies.122 Their 
120FAO, Perspective Study..., op. cit., 1972, pp. 1-10; 
and Arvind Das and V. Nilakant (eds.), Agrarian Relations 
in India, New Delhi, 1979. 
121See, for instance, evidence of clashes between small 
farmers and farm workers on the one hand and landlords 
and police on the other in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 
Economic and Political Weekly (for example 14 January 
and 22 April 1978 and 7 July, 22 October and 17 November 
1979). On the question of repression see Mohan Ram, 
"Mini-Emergencies to Suppress the Poor", Economic and 
Political Weekly, 18 November 1978. 
122See IBRD, World Bank Operations..., op. cit., 1972; 
IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975; IBRD, Annual Reports, 
1972-1979; FAO, Small Farmer Development Manuel, 
Bangkok, 1978; ADB, Asian Agricultural Survery, Manila, 
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individual stances have been very similar, part-
ly because of the strength of advanced capital-
ist nations in voting rights and policy-making, 
partly because of co-operative and co-financing 
arrangements between the agencies, and partly 
because of the paradigm that they used in com-
mon. And underlying all of this has been the 
fact that they were part of the capitalist world's 
response to economic and political conditions 
in Third World countries. They were an ad-
justment to facilitate the process of capitalist 
growth. 
From the mid-1950s the United States pro-
vided a major share of all foreign aid transfers to 
Third World countries. A decade later Wash-
ington was viewing the political situation 
with a certain urgency and, in the cold war 
years of the 1960s, a sustained United States 
commitment to increased aid became part of 
the counter-offensive against communist influ-
ence, compatible with the need for protecting 
United States interests, promoting and protec-
ting that country's investments and markets, 
supporting its allies in Third World countries 
and strengthening United States national secu-
rity.123 In 1970, with events in Vietnam coming 
to a head, USAID funding to South Vietnam 
(with a population of 15 million) were notably 
larger than those to India (with 600 million) or 
indeed to Latin America as a whole.124 Aid was 
clearly linked to foreign policy, just as, for 
example, French and British aid programmes 
reflected ties to former colonies and Common-
wealth countries. 
At the same time, with changing economic 
strategies in the 1950s and 1960s there was 
widening scope for European, Japanese and 
North American involvement by providing 
technology, managerial skills and capital in-
vestment. This could not be financed by pri-
1969; ADB, Rural Asia: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Singapore and New York, 1978; ADB, Annual Reports and 
IDB, Annual Reports. 
123See Abraham Lowenthal, "Alliance Rhetoric Versus 
Latin American Reality", Foreign Affairs, April 1970, pp. 
495 and 496. 
124In the fiscal year 1970 USAID flows to South Viet-
nam totalled USf 366 million, those to India came to US$ 
244 million, and for Latin America as a whole the figure was 
US$ 254 million. USAID, Fiscal Year 1970 Operations 
Report, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 5. 
vate capital alone, nor could individual govern-
ments always provide the infrastructure and 
necessary incentives to promote this expansion 
without a greater degree of external aid. There 
was an increase in the flow of resources from 
international lending institutions, the estab-
lishment of which had to a large extent been 
predicated on the idea of facilitating capitalist 
expansion while avoiding the overt political 
interest inherent in the notion of bilateral 
aid.125 
In the World Bank and the regional devel-
opment banks, voting power was linked to the 
size of each member country's contribution, 
and the relative strength of the advanced capi-
talist countries was such as to ensure that their 
interests were met within this new structure.126 
In 1964, in the case of the IDB Fund for Special 
Operations, the United States was able to im-
pose conditions ensuring that its increased con-
tributions could only be used for purchases in 
the USA, and that such goods must be trans-
ported in United States-registered ships.127 
Under the Bank ruling that a two-thirds majori-
ty was required for all decisions affecting the 
Fund, the United States, which controlled 
some 40% of the total vote, had an effective veto 
of moves that it did not approve.128 In 1972 the 
so-called 'Gonzalez Amendment' authorizing 
United States contributions to the IDA, IDB 
and the ADB laid down that United States Ex-
ecutive Directors in these agencies should vote 
against any loans or other forms of utilization of 
funds that were considered to run counter to 
that country's interests.129 Political controls 
were built into the logic and operation of these 
institutions. 
What is more, while an increasing number 
of bodies was involved, they were not acting 
independently of one another. The World Bank 
established a co-operative programme with the 
125See for example Sidney Dell, The Inter-American 
Development Bank: A Study in Development Financing, 
New York, 1972, chap. 1. 
^Annual Reports of the IBRD, IDB and ADB. 
127S. Dell, The Inter-American Development Bank..., 
op. cit., 1972, p. 114. 
128R. Peter Dewitt, "The Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and Policy-Making in Costa Rica", Journal of 
Developing Areas, Vol. 15, No. 1,1980. 
129Aart van de Laar, The World Bank and the Poor, The 
Hague, 1980, pp. 76-79. 
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FAO in the identification and preparation of its 
rural projects. Roughly a third of its agricultural 
lending was prepared in this way, with FAO 
staff working within the parameters of the 
Bank's lending policy.130 Similar arrangements 
were made with WHO, UNESCO and UNDP, 
and the Bank embarked on a programme of 
co-financing with regional bodies. One result 
of this external influence and interlinkage was 
that no effective 'alternative view' was likely to 
emerge. 
In all these institutions there was a gradual 
shift in policy emphasis over time, reflecting a 
continual reassesment of the perceived needs 
for capitalist expansion in terms of agricultural 
output and political stability. This can be seen 
in the changes that have taken place in World 
Bank policy, with its gradual move towards 
agriculture and 'the rural poor'. In the postwar 
era World Bank policies emphasized 'infra-
structural development'. Agriculture ac-
counted for only a small proportion of the 
Bank's total lending (8.5% up to 1963): the 
majority of this was on capital-intensive infra-
structure (such as large-scale dams and irriga-
tion systems), and it unashamedly pursued a 
laissez-faire notion that its task was to open the 
way for private investments.131 A significant 
proportion of the loans made during this period 
were clearly intended to meet the needs of 
large landowners.132 
Between 1964 and 1968, the share of total 
lending destined for agriculture increased (to 
12.6%) with emphasis on the export sector and 
iaoCheryl Payer, "The World Bank and Small Farm-
ers", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XVI, No. 4,1979, and 
Rosemary Galli, "The UNDP, 'Development' and Mul-
tinational Corporation", Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 
4, No. 4,1976. 
131IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, annexes 8 and 9, 
pp. 84-85, and chap. 3, pp. 58f. The total sum loaned was 
US$ 436 million. See Richard Stryker, "The World Bank 
and Agricultural Development: Food Production and Rural 
Poverty", World Development, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1979, John 
Adler, "The World Bank's Concept of Development", in 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard Eckaus (eds.), Development 
and Planning, London, 1972, pp. 34-36, and on IDB poli-
cies, S. Dell, The Inter-American Development Bank..., op. 
cit., 1972, p. 129. 
132The Bank's 'dogmatic preference' for private owner-
ship and private enterprise is stressed by R. Stryker, The 
World Bank..., op. cit., 1979, pp. 326f. See also Feder, The 
New World Bank Programme..., op. cit., 1976, p. 344. 
on livestock production.133 This sector was 
frequently characterized by large-scale (even 
foreign) ownership,134 and again if often con-
tained a large irrigation component.135 How-
ever, with agriculture increasingly seen as a 
'bottleneck' holding back industrialization and 
'economic development', the Bank also began 
to turn its attention to the need to promote 
technological change at the farm level 
through the provision of improved seeds, fertil-
izers and modern equipment.136 Policies began 
to be viewed in a broader perspective, covering 
credit, road construction, processing industries 
and, to a lesser extent, education and health 
facilities.137 
Between 1969 and 1973, with mounting 
evidence of the landlessness, differentiation 
and pauperization produced in the wake of the 
so-called 'Green Revolution', and with an in-
creasing threat of rural social unrest, there was 
a shift in the emphasis of World Bank policy 
towards the eradication of poverty as against 
growth per se, and to employment creation 
rather than simply an increase in gross national 
production.138 By the 1970s, Ul Haq was openly 
talking of injecting distributional issues "into 
the very pattern and organisation of produc-
tion".139 However, the stress was still quite 
clearly on non-food crops, and this was even 
true in the case of food-deficit countries.140By 
^Between fiscal years 1961-1965 and 1966-1970 
loans for livestock production increased from US$ 35.3 
million to US$ 252.4 million. Loans for non-food crops 
increased from US$ 2.8 million to US$ 86.8 million. To-
gether, their share rose from 8% to 28% of agricultural loans 
(IBRD, The Assault..., op, cit., 1979, p. 327). 
134R. Stryker, The World Bank..., op. cit., 1979, p. 327. 
135Between the fiscal years 1966 and 1970 irrigation 
accounted for 43% of all agricultural loans. This was less 
than the 79% recorded over the previous five financial 
years, but it was still considerable (IBRD, The Assault..., 
op. cit., 1975, annex 9, p. 85.) 
™Ibid.,p. 59. 
i37/fo¿í/.(PP.58f. 
mbid., p. 60; and R. Stryker, The World Bank..., op. 
cit., 1979, p. 328. 
1S9M. Ul Haq, The Poverty Curtain..., op. cit., 
1976, p. 34. 
140S. J. Burki and T. J. Goering, A Perspective on the 
Foodgrain Situation in the Poorest Countries, World Bank 
Staff Working Paper No. 251, April 1977, p. 41. The experi-
ence of the Sahelian zone during this period appears to 
have been a clear-cut example of this. See Comité d'Infor-
mation Sahel, Qui se Nourrit..., op. cit., 1975. 
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this time agrieulture accounted for some 19% of 
total Bank lending.14* 
With the world food crisis, and with high 
and increasing rates of unemployment, atten-
tion was turned to food production and the 
small producer. The total amount loaned in-
creased dramatically (from US$ 12 700 million 
over the fiscal years 1969-1973 to US$ 32 320 
million over the period 1974-1978); and the 
share of this devoted to agriculture rose sharply 
(to 31%), with roughly half the agricultural 
lending going to projects for domestic food 
production.142 
In short, the changing emphasis of World 
Bank policy followed closely shifts in the in-
terpretation of 'development policy* as seen 
from the vantage point of the advanced capital-
ist nations. The emphasis on the poor and on 
food production was a response to a deteriora-
ting food situation, and it followed closely on 
the passing of the US Foreign Assistance Act of 
1973, which reflected the growing concern of 
the United States Government over the risk of 
'internal subversion' in Third World coun-
tries.143 The policy that was to emerge was such 
as to provide greater control of peasant pro-
ducers, hitherto seen as 'the great unknown' of 
the national economy and as an area of poten-
tially dangerous social unrest. By commercial-
izing this sector, it was gradually brought into 
the realm of government planning. 
The technocratic rationale behind the poli-
cies of the World Bank and similar institutions 
hinged on two central factors —the imbalance 
between agricultural output (especially food 
production) and population growth, and the 
inefficiency of existing agrarian structures in 
terms of productivity per hectare and employ-
ment creation. The first of these focussed at-
tention on the low (and declining) rate of 
growth in per capita (food) production, and the 
MlIBRD, Annua/ Report, 1974, p. 13. 
M*See R. Striker, The World Bank..., op. cit, 1979, p. 
327, and IBRD, Annual Report, 1977 and 1978. In real terms 
this was in fact considerably more than die target that 
McNamara had projected in his Nairobi speech. It almost 
doubled (in real terms) relative to the previous 5 years, and 
it was some 35% higher than he had ancitipated (IBRD, 
Annual Report, 1979, pp. 17-18). 
143A. Van de Laar, The World Bank..., op. cit., 
1980, p. 78. 
second stressed the underutilization of land 
and the constraints imposed by prevailing 
ownership and tenure patterns. Both had to be 
seen against the economic and political situa-
tion of the early 1970s and conventional inter-
pretations of the problems involved. 
The logic of their argument was in essence 
the following. To reduce rural poverty, policies 
had to raise the level of production and produc-
tivity in the small-farm sector. In the World 
Bank's view, what was needed was a doubling 
of the rate of growth in output from this sector 
from 2.5% p.a. by 1985.144 This would enable 
farmers to double their annual output by the 
end of the century, halting the disparity in 
income distribution and starting to reduce it by 
the 1990s.145 
How this was to be achieved was of course 
the important issue. As McNamara himself re-
marked in his Nairobi speech:146 "a 5% rate of 
growth has never been achieved on a sustained 
basis among small-holders in any extensive 
areas of the developing world". 
An expansion of these proportions in the small-
farm sector could only be achieved with a high 
rate of technical innovation, and more particu-
larly * through the increased use of purchase 
inputs and the provision of adequate infrastruc-
tural support.147 What was proposed was basi-
cally a package' solution aimed at 'target 
groups' of the rural poor. This view was subse-
quently repeated in the Manila Declaration, 
which saw the small farmer as 'the backbone of 
agriculture'.148 
l^The United Nations/FAO World Plan for Agricul-
tural Development has estimated that for food production 
to rise by 4.3% p.a. between 1967 and 1985 to meet domes-
tic demand, the marketable surplus would have to rise by 
some 5-6% p.a. 
145MeNamara's Nairobi Address. For a summary see 
IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975. 
™lbid. 
147IBRD, World Bank Operations..., op. cit., 1972, p. 6; 
IBRD, Annual Report, 1975, pp. 16f. This strategy was never 
in fact made precise, and there was no solid and detailed 
elaboration of it. On the contrary, the Bank maintained that 
"there is no universal formula that prescribes the right mix, 
or the most effective sequence of activities to raise the 
incomes of the rural poor" (The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, 
p. 18). On the 'package' approach see IBRD, ibid-, pp. 8 and 
40f. 
148Manila Declaration on Food and Agriculture, Thir-
teenth FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East, 
Manila, 5-13 August 1976. 
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The Bank adopted the view that the ef-
ficiency of the small farm had been seriously 
misconceived: in point of fact small-farmer 
production was labour-intensive, it offered a 
higher output per unit of land, and it was more 
efficient in the use of on-farm resources. As 
higher yielding varieties increased the number 
of production cycles, the employment that was 
generated in any one year would be that much 
greater. In this way the strategy was believed to 
be particularly well suited to meeting the 
needs of Third World development. 
At the same time it was recognized that 
existing agrarian structures were part of the 
problem, that they were likely to hamper poli-
cies aimed at the poor, and that land reform was 
an increasingly pressing issue. "The more 
secure producers", it was argued in justifica-
tion,149 "tend to invest part of their higher 
earnings in their holdings —thus raising the 
level of investment in agricultural produc-
tion— whereas absentee landlords frequendy 
invest in off-farm activities". Earnings would 
be higher because less was tapped off by land-
lords and because security of tenure favoured 
better production methods. But even so, it was 
clearly recognized that achieving this was un-
likely in practice to prove sufficient without a 
complementary readjustment in the input de-
livery system and in marketing facilities.150 
This in turn led to the view that a 'comprehen-
sive' or 'integrated* approach was what was re-
quired. 
Such was the basic philosophy of the new 
approach to small-farmer policies. The poor 
were poor, not because they had been mar-
ginalized by the activities of richer farmers and 
of agribusiness, but because they had been left 
behind by the process of 'economic develop-
ment'. Subsistence farming was taken to be 
more or less synonymous with poverty, and 
emphasis was placed on new technology and 
increasing government intervention "to bring 
this silent or passive majority into the main-
1 4 9 IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, p . 223. 
150FAO, Small-Farmer Development Manual..., op. 
cit., 1978, p . 156; IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, pp. 
161f, and ADB, Annual Report for 1979, p . 28. 
stream of economic growth and social pro-
gress".151 
The World Bank, as we have seen, 
made much of its small-farmer emphasis; 
the resources it channelled to agriculture 
(US$ 10 018.6 million between 1974 and 1978) 
were very impressive, and in 1978 it proudly 
announced with regard to its small-farmer poli-
cy that "all the targets set have been achie-
ved".152 How, then, should this be interpreted? 
Certainly it could not be taken to mean that the 
problems of rural poverty had markedly less-
ened. What had happened was that the political 
fears of the early 1970s had not materialized, 
and attention was shifting to the more 
volatile problem of the urban poor.153 
In analysing what was happening it seems 
important to maintain a careful sense of per-
spective. For example, while the flow of funds 
available to agriculture through multilateral 
agencies rose quite dramatically, the total flow 
of aid to the sector increased at a slower rate, 
reflecting the shift away from bilateral aid.154 At 
the same time, the agencies retained a steady (if 
not growing) interest in agro-industry and 
large-scale agro-commercial concerns. An anal-
ysis of the loans and equity investments of the 
International Finance Company (IFC) —itself 
a member of the World Bank Group— shows a 
definite interest in agribusiness, and the total 
investments in agro-industry which it co-fi-
nanced showed a gradual rise.155 It was by no 
1 5 1ADB, Rural Asia..., op. cit., 1978, p . 216. A similar 
thrust can be found in the writings of the other develop-
men t banks and of the relevant United Nations organiza-
tions. 
1521BRD, Annual Report, 1978, p . 18. 
1 5 3This can be seen from the IBRD, Annual Report 
1979, pp. 22f. The growing concern with problems ofurban 
poverty is clearly visible in the Bank's Annual Reports from 
1977 onwards. 
1 5 4In Asia, for example, aid from multilateral agencies 
increased fourfold between 1969 and 1974 but total aid 
flows rose by the much lower (though still significant) fig-
ure of 59%. ADB, Rural Asia..., op. cit., 1977, table IV-1.1, 
p . 296. 
1 5 5From its establishment in 1956 to 1977 only some 
4% of total IFC commitments went to food or food pro-
cessing firms. At the end of this period McNamara was 
looking to a new phase of IFC expansion in precisely this 
area, and Henri Bedie was appointed special adviser to see 
this through. The proportion of its total investment chan-
nel led to agro-industry in the fiscal year 1980 rose to almost 
15%, and the IFC Annual Report for 1979 predicted that 
ON THE HISTORY AND POUTICAL ECONOMY OF SMALL-FARMER POLICIES / David Dunham 165 
means the case that there was a sustained and 
all-out effort at small-farmer development. 
Even within the small-farm sector Bank 
figures themselves reveal that less than a 
quarter of World Bank loans (three-quarters of 
the 31% devoted to agriculture) were chan-
nelled into rural development projects with a 
small-farmer component, and that in these pro-
jects almost half of the direct benefits went 
—on its own admission— to other groups.156 
An analysis of the approved projects con-
tained in the World Bank's Annual Reports for 
1974-1978 suggests that even this more modest 
view might be optimistic. Though descriptions 
of individual projects are admittedly brief, the 
intended beneficiaries are generally indicated, 
and the impression gained from their analysis 
is itself revealing. They indicate that the World 
Bank estimates of its small-farmer effort are 
high —if not actually exaggerated, that 'poor 
small farmers* appear to have comprised a 
comparatively small proportion (a little more 
than a quarter) of all 'small-farmer' funds, and 
that while total funds to agriculture have been 
steadily rising, the proportion allocated to 
small farmers has in fact decreased. Indeed, the 
image that begins to emerge from this 'small-
farmer policy' is that promoting and extending 
the commercialization of viable farms has had 
precedence over concern for the poorer, more 
marginal producer. 
A cautious reading of the Bank's own poli-
cy statements also shows that from the very 
beginning it had every intention of continuing 
its assistance to large-scale producers. It was 
certainly far easier to help those with 'some tan-
gible assets'. 157With emphasis placed on rapid 
commercialization, the provision of credit was 
a crucial element in the overall strategy, but 
projects dealing with the production and processing of 
agricultural resources would in future comprise "an in-
creasing share of IFC's investment activités" (p. 17). This 
expansion was not, however, sustained: IFC funding fell 
sharply from 1978, but the total value of agro-industrial 
investments that were IFC-assisted continued to rise (IFC, 
Annual Reports). 
156
 IBRD, Annual Report, 1978, p. 18. 
157M. Ul Haq, "Changing Emphasis of the Bank's 
Lending Policies", Finance and Development, Vol. 15, No. 
2,1978. 
this was not even primarily intended for poorer 
producers. Credit would be given to the larger-
scale farmers "when it (was) necessary to raise 
their production in order to increase domestic 
food supplies and/or contribute to exports".158 
This was an important caveat, and over half of 
the credit was earmarked for such producers.159 
It was explicitly stated that "increased atten-
tion to small farmers should not, however, ob-
scure the need for additional significant in-
creases in aid to other groups, especially me-
dium-scale farmers".160 And indeed it did not. 
One study of some 18 small-farmer projects 
in Africa and Latin America financed and im-
plemented with international aid found that 
two-thirds were focussed on 'progressive' farm-
ers and that only one was specifically focussed 
on weaker groups.161 In Ghana the FAO-spon-
sorod 'focus and concentrate' programme was 
geared to 'co-operators' whose farm size was in 
practice double the local average, while in 
Kenya the (British/I BRD/IDA-financed) Tea 
Development Authority restricted small-farm-
er participation on economic grounds.162 In 
Guatemala 'small farmers' were defined as 
producers with less than 45 hectares of land 
(encompassing 97% of all producers). Half of 
the funds were allocated to these 'small farm-
ers', the remainder going to 'larger' farms in the 
top 3%.163 Elsewhere, when new resources 
were fed into an unequal agrarian structure, 
they generally tended to favour the more pow-
158IBRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, p. 12. 
iS9Ibid., p. 118. See also ADB, Rural Asia..., op. cit., 
1978, and S. Dell, The Inter-American Development 
Bank..., op. cit., 1974. 
1601BRD, The Assault..., op. cit., 1975, p. 118. Similarly 
the ADB argued (Rural Asia..., op. cit., 1978, p. 219) that 
"although the large mass of the peasantry in these countries 
comprise small and marginal farmers, the bulk of produc-
tion and most of the marketable surplus comes from me-
dium-sized or^large farms. It becomes expedient, therefore, 
to cater to the needs of the latter in order to augment 
production". 
161Elliot Morss, John Hatch, Donald Mickelwait and 
Charles Sweet, Strategies for Small-Farmer Development, 
Boulder, Colorado, 1976, Volume I, p. 17. 
mIbid., Vol. II; case studies. 
163Institute for Food and Development Policy, The Aid 
Debates: Assessing the Impact of US Foreign Assistance 
and the World Bank, 1979, quoted in C. Payer, The World 
Bank..., op. cit., 1979, p. 306. 
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erful groups regardless of the intention of poli-
cy-makers.164 
Once these farmers were incorporated into 
the emerging system they also became depen-
dent upon it. There was often a high degree of 
government control in terms of the crops to be 
grown, the inputs to be used, the timing of 
various procedures and the marketing chan-
nels. There was little scope for individual deci-
sion-making or variations from die 'official' 
view of what should be done.165 Indeed, in 
many cases the shift to modernized production 
was almost mandatory, and even carried 
through in the face of opposition.166Those who 
accepted the model and the opportunities be-
came dependent for advice, inputs and often 
for marketing on government officials, or even 
on officials of the donor agency that was in-
volved. 
And the list could be extended. In general, 
however, it could be said that credit and other 
resources tended to go to the more wealthy 
stratum rather than to 'the poorest of the poor'. 
This aid was strengthening or creating a layer 
of 'progressive' farmers relying for their inputs 
and their prosperity on the bureaucracy and the 
government in power. It was this smaller group 
of the 'not-so-poor' smaller and medium-scale 
farmers who werejn feet to provide the dynam-
ics of the 5% growth rate that McNamara fore-
saw. 
Finally, in analysing the policies of these 
institutions some attention must be paid to the 
countries that received the bulk of the financial 
aid and the underlying alliance of interests mat 
this implied. What this reveals in essence is 
that, in addition to concern for increasing the 
output of the agricultural sector, there have 
been strong political considerations in the al-
location of funds, reinforcing established cap-
italist regimes or serving an important stabi-
lizing function in areas of possible rural unrest 
or 'insurgency'. For example, the involment of 
164See for example papers evaluating the DRI Pro-
gramme, Departamento Nacional de Planificación, Bogotá; 
and USAID, Spring Review..., Vol. XIX, op. cit., 1973. 
l65See M. Nelson, The Development..., op. cit., 1973, 
pp. 81-82; USAID, Spring Review, Vol. XIX, op. cit., 1973, 
and E. Morss et al., Small Farmer..., op. cit., 1976. 
««See C. Payer, The World Bank..., op. cit., 1979, pp. 
296f. 
USAID in the drought-stricken countries of the 
Sahelian region and the transfer there of a 
French-speaking technical assistance team 
from Indo-China after the Vietnam war re-
flected a fear of mounting Russian and Cuban 
influence within that area. When people have 
land, inputs and the possibility of reasonable 
subsistence or a higher income, they also tend 
to be more conservative, and to see more risk in 
radical points of view. What is more, their de-
pendence on modern delivery systems and 
marketing arrangements makes them far more 
open to government control. Given mis thrust 
and the economic self-interest of capitalist 
countries in opening up markets, it was per-
haps hardly surprising that there should have 
been no clear relationship between the level of 
development of individual countries and the 
size of the loans which they received. Table 1 
shows the top ten recipient countries of World 
Bank and IDA loans for agricultural and rural 
development over the period 1974-1978, to-
gether with estimates of their per capita GNP at 
the beginning and at the end of this policy 
period. 
These ten countries account for over 55% of 
Table 1 
MAIN RECIPIENTS OF WORLD BANK AND IDA 
LOANS FOR AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT, 1974-1978 
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Source: World Bank, Annual Reports 1974-1978 and World 
Bank, Atlas, 1975 and 1979. 
aAt market prices. 
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the total loans to the agricultural sector, and it is 
quite evident that with the notable exception of 
India and Indonesia none were among the 43 
lowest-income countries by World Bank cri-
teria.167 On the contrary, Mexico, Brazil, South 
Korea,168 Malaysia and Turkey were fairly dy-
namic middle-income countries, while accord-
ing to World Bank figures Romania was among 
the richest of all. Furthermore, these countries 
included not only some of the most stalwart 
capitalist economies, but also some of themost 
conservative and socially unresponsive politi-
cal regimes.169 
It is true that the IDA component did not 
reflect this tendency, and that there was a dis-
tinction between World Bank and IDA funds, 
since the latter were intended for the poorest 
countries (with a per capita income of less than 
US$ 520 at 1975 prices) which could not afford 
the near-commercial rates of the IBRD. How-
ever, the funds available through the IDA were 
comparatively small and they were concen-
trated. Between 1974 and 1978 some 42% of all 
IDA loans to the agricultural sector went to 
India alone (US$ 1 408.6 million). Though In-
dia contained less than a quarter of the eligible 
population for IDA loans by World Bank crite-
ria,170 this was to some extent understandable, 
as it was indeed one of the poorest and most 
populous countries. Put another way, slightly 
over 60% of the world population were tech-
nically eligible for IDA loans, while the latter 
comprised little more than a third of all funding 
available from the IBRD. 
In the case of the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank over half of its loans were from 
l67The lowest-income countries have been defined by 
the Bank as those with a per capita GNP of less than US$ 
200 p.a. World Bank, Atlas for 1975, p.8. 
168While the per capita income of South Korea was 
comparatively low in 1974, it increased rapidly to US$ 700 
in 1976 and US$ 810 in 1977. 
I69rhis is even more apparent in the case of World 
Bank loans, where the main recipients were (in order) Mex-
ico, Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, South Korea, Malay-
sia, Turkey, Nigeria, Romania and Thailand. These 10 
countries accounted for 63% of all loans to the agricultural 
sector. 
170It comprised roughly two-thirds of the total popula-
tion in the poorest (less than US$ 200/income group. It is 
clear that priority was being given to this group, the only 
exception being Morocco, which had a per capita income in 
1974 of US J 430. 
the outset focussed on only four countries 
—Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and later Colom-
bia— and although low-income countries fared 
better in the distribution of concessionary FSO 
loans (Fund for Special Operations, compara-
ble to the IDA), even there very clear anom-
alies could be observed.171 In the case of the 
Asian Development Bank almost 60% of all 
loans went to South Korea, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Pakistan in that order, while 
Bangladesh and Pakistan received the bulk of 
its Special Funds (44% over the period 1967-
1979).172 The availability of 'suitable' projects 
no doubt had an influence on the annual alloca-
tion of funds, but the overall pattern that was to 
be observed in all these agencies reflected an 
underlying concern with political stability and 
economic expansion. 
The aid policies of multilateral (and most 
bilateral) agencies reflected the economic and 
political self-interest of the advanced capitalist 
nations who were the major subscribers. They 
were built on current theories about 'the needs 
of development', but in practice they fitted a 
longer historical tradition in which small-farm-
er policies were introduced according to the 
needs of a broader economic and political strat-
egy aimed at capitalist expansion. 
Finally, the discussion of small-farmer pol-
icies cannot stop at an analysis of their objec-
tives and the distribution of funds. It must also 
look at their implementation, and several 
points can be made in this regard to re-empha-
size some of the underlying forces at work. 
Firstly, multilateral agencies work through a 
bureaucratic apparatus amongst whose senior 
staff the advanced capitalist countries are 
strongly represented. Stringent appraisal, pro-
curement and disbursement procedures are 
used as a means of control, and they provide a 
bias towards capital-intensive projects with a 
large import component.173 
171S. Dell, The Inter-American Development Bank..., 
op. cit., 1972, pp. 126-129, for the period 1961-1970, and 
IDB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 36. Over the period 1961-
1979 FSO funds went primarily to Brazil, Colombia, Mexi-
co and Bolivia in that order. In the earlier part of the period 
(1961-1970) they went (again in order of total volume al-
located) to Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Argentina. 
172ADB, Annual Report, 1979, p. 23. 
173S. Dell, Inter-American Development Bank..., op. 
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Secondly, the nature of these projects is 
frequently such mat they are dominated by 
engineering concerns or by a hefty administra-
tive apparatus. Many projects have in practice 
suffered from both. Those which have a large 
irrigation component or those opening new 
land have been planned with a heavy emphasis 
on engineering criteria; the physical layout was 
normally decided first (often to a remarkable 
degree of detailed design, such as the location 
of homesteads and delimitation of plots) and 
social factors (the nature of the rural communi-
ty) have proved at best to be of only secondary 
concern.174 
From the very beginning, the planning of a 
small-farmer project was likely to revolve 
around the use of norms, standardized proce-
dures and a fixed image as to the most 'appropri-
ate' farming unit, based on the idea of *the in-
dependent, individualist peasant proprietor*. 
The unit in mind was generally one small 
enough to be worked with family labour. Ideal-
ly, the plots would be of equal size (in the belief 
that this would remove an important source of 
inequality), and wherever possible let under 
strict conditions forbidding sale for profit, 
mortgaging of land or its fragmentation.m All of 
this was likely in practice to be totally different 
from the life and expectations of peasants in 
existing production areas. 
Once the project was established, it was 
usually characterized by a strong degree of ad-
ministrative control and a paternalistic attitude 
towards the producer. In Morocco it has been 
noted that the staff of small-farmer projects 
tended 'to be highly authoritarian and empha-
cit., 1972, p. 42, and R.P. Dewitt, The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank..., op. cit., 1980. 
174In this respect see David Dunham, "Settlement 
Schemes and Family Farms as Policy Options: The Case of 
the Mahaweli Ganga Development Programme", ISS, The 
Hague, 1979; M. Nelson, The Development..., op. cit., 
1973; Mahaweli Development Board, Proposals for Hu-
man Settlement, Colombo, April 1978, and Marshall Wolfe, 
"Rural Settlement Patterns of Social Change in Latin 
America: Notes for a Strategy of Rural Development", Lat-
in American Research Review, Vol. 1, No. 2,1966. 
175On the general insensitivity to existing rural insti-
tutions see Urna Lele, The Design of Rural Development, 
IBRD, Baltimore, 1975, p. 176. This runs throughout the 
thinking on integrated rural development. 
size control';176 much the same is true of the 
Autorité des Ménagements des Vallées des 
Volta (AW) in Upper Volta, the Mahaweli Gan-
ga scheme in Sri Lanka, and many more.177 In 
the majority of cases the need for technical ad-
vice (given the parameters laid down by project 
officials) was a real one but the officials' role in 
farm management decisions was often such 
that the farmer was left with little say in the way 
that the farm was run. Finally, it must be added 
that many of the prominent officials were for-
eign nationals;178 indeed, both in the engineer-
ing emphasis and the administration of individ-
ual small-farmer projects, foreign 'expert' ad-
vice was often necessary, or was laid down as a 
condition of external aid. 
The lack of concern with the nature of the 
rural community that was being created tended 
to promote individualism and to foster a greater 
degree of differentiation. The organization of 
farmers was strictly supervised, and beyond 
the needs of production and marketing it was in 
many instances actively discouraged. In Boli-
via (in Alti Beni II),179 "traditional campesino 
unions were banned, while the cooperatives 
imposed were specifically prohibited from tak-
ing any political overtones". 
In Colombia organizations formed under 
the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(DRI) were confined to marketing,180 and in 
many other areas the power of 'progressive' 
farmers was such as to limit the effective viabil-
ity of farmers' organizations and peasant 
unions. 
In short, small-farmer policies have tended 
to be heavily oriented towards increased out-
put and commercialization, with more concern 
iTfiCynthia Gillette, "The Credit Connection: Cultural 
and Social Factors Affecting Small-Farmer Participation in 
Credit Programmes", USAID, Spring Review, 1973, p. 167. 
177See European Economic Community, Programme 
Global d'Etudes d'Investissement de l'AW, Brussels, 
1978, and Rapport sur la Campagne Agricole, Ouagadou-
gou, 1978. See also Chambers, Settlement Schemes..., op. 
cit., 1969, pp. 83f. On the Mahaweli see Henk van Roosma-
len, Social Aspects of Settlement in the Mahaweli, The 
Hague, 1979. 
l78See E. Morss et al. Strategies..., op. cit., 1976, pas-
sim. 
l^M. Nelson, The Development..., op. cit., 1973, p. 93. 
180DNP/DRI, Evaluación del impacto socioeconómi-
co: subprograma comercialización de DRI áreas 4, Bogotá, 
August 1980. 
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for efficiency in agricultural production than 
for the way it affects the lives and communities 
of small producers. The policies themselves 
have tended to be such that they have served to 
create a stratum of wealthier, more successful 
farmers and more inequalities, or else they 
have strengthened already powerful groups in 
the local community.181 There is no doubt that a 
great many small farmers have benefitted (of-
ten substantially) as a result of these pro-
grammes; many projects have seen a notable 
increase in productivity, and in others the area 
cropped has expanded considerably, often with 
a rise in producer prices and in the average 
income of people in the area of the project 
concerned.182 This is not in dispute. The point 
18ISee materials on the impact of the Colombian DRI 
Programme and the case of the FLDA Land Development 
Schemes in West Malaysia (for example, Noel Benjamin, 
"The Role of Land Settlement in the Economic Develop-
ment of West Malaysia 1957-1970", Development and 
Change, Vol. 9f No. 4,1978, pp. 581-598. 
182See for example DNP/DRI, La silenciosa transfor-
mación del campesino minifundista en Antioquía, Bogotá, 
June 1980; DNP/DRI Evaluación del Impacto..., op. cit; 
and Sector Público Agrícola y Secretaría del Consejo Na-
cional de Planificación Económica, Análisis del impacto 
del crédito de fincas pequeñas sobre ingreso, empleo y 
producción agropecuarios, Guatemala, June 1976. 
is that along with it has tended to come increas-
ing differentiation and inequality. 
The policies of international development 
agencies have tended to be such that govern-
ments have had to tailor their own develop-
ment plans to these ideas in order to obtain 
loans, and such have been the accumulated 
debts of many of these nations that external 
capital has been crucial to their survival. The 
small-farmer thrust implied commercialization 
of the peasant sector, dependent on the capi-
talist economy for modern inputs and subject to 
a high degree of administrative control. It has 
been slowly drawn into the ambit of govenment 
planning; in the process it has become a manip-
ulable element in economic strategy, less sus-
ceptible to the influence of radical groups and 
rural unrest. 
In this sense small-farmer policies have 
been part of the response of capitalist nations to 
the perceived needs and threats of the 1970s. 
They fitted a historically established pattern of 
adjustments and coercions designed to make 
use of the small-farm sector for wider needs. 
Small-farmer policies in this direction were not 
as much a solution to the poverty problem as a 
set of measures reproducing and reinforcing si-
tuations in which marginalization continued or 
was in fact made worse. 
